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INTRODUCTION 
Spain  asked  for  special  relations  with  the Ca..unity 
as  long  ago  as  1962  but  for  reasons  related  to  the  political 
situation  in  Spain,  the  Community  turned  down  the  request.  It 
was,  therefore  only  much  later,  i.e.  on  28  July 1977,  that the 
Spanish government  applied officially to  join the  Community. 
From  the  Spanish  angle,  the  application  for  aellber-
ship  is  the  in~vitable  consequence  of  the  far-reaching changes 
marked  by  the  advent  of  democratic  government.  There  has been 
no  organized  opposition  in  Spain,  as  there  was  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  to  the  country's  plan  to  become  a  member  of  the 
Co~~~auni  ty.  Members  of  the  Study  Group  who  went  to  Spain  did 
notice,  however,  a  certain  degree  of  reticence  on  the  part  of 
some  farmers'  representatives  afraid  of'  a  reduction  in  their 
income  guarantees  (*).  Similarly,  some  industrial  representa-
tives f'ear  that Spanish  industry will suffer as a  result of EEC 
membership,  because  of'  its  low  productivity,  the  small  size  o~ 
Spanish  companies  and  its  level  of'  technological  advancement 
(**).  Some  observers  also  consider  that  it would  be  unwise  to 
underestimate  the  economic  and  social  consequences  of a  rapid, 
comprehensive  opening  up  of'  Spain's frontiers. 
All  of'  the  nine  Member  States  governments  have  co.e 
out  in  support  of,  the  Spanish  application.  This  paper  has 
accordingly  been  written  on  the  assUIIlption  that  it  is  the 
intention of  the  nine  Member  Governments  and  of the Govern.ent 
of' Spain  to  secure  Spanish entry into  the  Community  if' ter.s 
(•)  Particularly where  the organization of the Spanish market 
provides for a  marketing guarantee. 
(••)  Study published in February 1979  by  the  Catalan employers• 
~ederation review  "Horizonte Eapresarial". - 2  -
satisfactory  to  all  parties  can  be  agreed.  On  this  basis,  the 
paper  attempts  to  examine  some  aspects  of  the  relationship 
between  the  Community  and  Spain  between  now  and  the  tiae  when 
spain becomes  a  full  Member. 
It should,  however,  be  noted  that misgivings are being 
voiced  abou-t  Spanish  entry  by  represmtatives  of  some  econo•!c 
sectors and  socio-professional grou9s.  There  has also been soae 
minority poiitica1  opposition in  som~  count~i~s. 
Generally  speaking,  Spain  is  gradually  becoming  more 
aware  of  the  difficulties  which  would  be  raised  by  membership. 
The  government  and public  opinion considered that the applica-
tion  for  membership  above  all  set  the  seal  on  the  move  towards 
freedom  and  democracy.  They  were  also  hoping  no  doubt for  more 
help  from  the  EEC  in  trade,  industry,  and  agriculture  and  the 
social  sector.  It  would  now  seem  that  the  matter  is  more 
complicated and  that negotiations will  be protracted. 
It  is  vital  to  both  sides  that  the  period  leading  up 
to  full  membership  be  planned  on  a  clear  and  equitable  basis, 
and  that  major  efforts  be  made  to  facilitate  the  full  integra-
tion of the  Spanish and  EEC  economies. - 3  -
On  29  November  1978,  the  Commission  submitted  its 
Opinion  on  Spain's  application  for  membership.  This  Opinion 
outlined  the  economic  situation  in  the  CoDDUnity  and  in  Spain 
and  then  assessed  the  impact  of  membership  on  the  various 
sectors  of  activity.  It also  contained  a  number of conclusions 
and  recommendations  relating  to  the  transitional  measures which 
would  enable  Spain  to  adopt  all  the  Co1111uni ty  legislation  and 
ensure  an  orderly integration of its economy  in the EEC. 
At  the  request  of  the  Spanish  government  and  for 
internal  political  reasons  (the  forthcoming  elections),  nego-
tiations  were  officially  begun  on  6  February 1979.  But  in view 
of  the  state  of preparedness  of  the  dossiers,  the  real negotia-
tions will probably not begin until  the  autumn. 
l. DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  SPAIN  AND  THE  COMMUNITY 
When  the  countries  of  the  West  established  various 
torms  of  international  cooperation  after  the  second  World  War, 
Spain  because  of  its  political  regime  stayed  on  the 
Sidelines. - 4  -
Unlike  other  European  countries  which  are  not  members 
of  the  EEC,  Spain  did  not  join  EFTA.  Discussions  with  EFTA 
about  a  free  trade  area were  only concluded at  the  end of 1978. 
The  1970  trade  agreement  was  the  first  move  towards  alignment 
with Europe. 
Economically,  Spain  is  making  up  lost  ground,  though 
its  per  capita  GDP  has  only  reached  half  that  of  tht:  EEC 
average  ( *)  : 
Spain 
The  Nine 
2.855  $ 
5.350  $ 
2.933  $ 
5.614  $ 
2.985  $ 
5.757  $ 
Spain  also has  a  relatively protectionist  economy with 
high  customs  tariffs  (e.g.  20%  on  clothing  and  cars,  18%  on 
electrical  equipment,  15%  on  synthetics  and  footwear,  11.5%  on 
packaged  fruit  and  vegetables;  together,  these  sec tors  account 
for  35%  of GOP).  (The  Community's  external  tariff wall  averages 
about  5%).  Moreover,  Spain's trade with  the  outside world  is, 
proportionately speaking,  lower  than 
(exports as percentage of GDP  in 1975 
that  of  any  EEC  country 
7.6%  as against  16%  in 
(*)  Source  OECD  provisional  figures  for  1978. - 5  -
France,  21.3~  in  Germany,  42.4%  in  the  Netherlands,  41.2%  in 
Ireland,  20.2%  in  Italy,  19.2"  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  24.5~ 
in  Denmark  (*));  it  should,  however,  be  remembered  that  per 
capita GDP  in Spain is very  low.  The  public  sector only  absorbs 
26%  of  the  GDP  (taxes  and  social  security  benefits),  as 
against an  average  of 41%  in  the  Community. 
In Spain,  agriculture is still a  major  source  of jobs, 
employing  20%  of  the  labour  force.  Spanish  agricultural  pro-
ducts  appear  earlier  on  the  market  than  those  of  the  Community 
and  Spain's fruit and vegetables account  for  30%  of the  value of 
the  country's  crop  output  and  21%  of total agricultural produc-
tion. 
Spain's  entry will  increase  the  EEC  agricultural  area 
by  30%,  the  agricultural  workforce  by  31%  and  the  number  of 
farms  by  31%.  Spain's  degree  of  self-sufficiency  in  farm 
products  is  already  243%  for  citrus  fruits,  115"  for  fresh 
fruit,  115"  for  vegetables,  169%  for  olive  oil,  125%  for  rice, 
110%  for wine  and  111%  for wheat. 
Thanks  to  a  highly  protected  market,  the  degree  of 
self-sufficiency  in  recent  years  has  also  reached  101%  for 
barley,  102%  for eggs,  102%  for  lamb  and  mutton,  92%  for poultry 
and  9~ for pork. 
In  some  respects  Spanish  legislation  and  regulations 
are still quite  different  from  those  of the  Community. 
(*)  Source  OECD. - 6  -
For  example,  the  EEC  has  introduced  a  system  of  VAT 
after  a  12-year  transi  tiona!  period  while  Spain  still  has  a 
multi-stage  turnover  tax  system.  This  obviously  creates  prob-
lems  in  the  foreign-trade field.  In  1978  the  Spanish  Government 
introduced  a  Bill  to bring about  a  decisive  change  by  incorpora-
ting  VAT  in  the  country's  tax  system. 
Spain  has  very  much  gone  its  own  way  in  terms  of 
foreign  policy  over  the  last  few  decades  whereas  the  Co~munity 
has  gradually  built  up  a  network  of  links  with  a  number  of 
non-member  countries  and  the  Third  World.  These  links  have 
taken widely  differing forms  : 
- The  free  trade  area which  has  existed between  the  EEC  and  EFTA 
since  1  July  1977,  as  far as  industrial  goods  are  concerned; 
- Association  agreements  have  been  concluded  with  Greece  and 
Turkey; 
- Preferential  trade  agreements  or  association  agreements  have 
been  concluded  with  the  Mediterranean  countries,  including  a 
free-trade  and  cooperation  agreement  with Israel; 
- The  Lome  Convention  links  the  Community  with  56  African, 
Caribbean  and Pacific  countries; 
- The  Community  applies  a  Generalized  Tariff  Preferences  Scheme 
(GSP)  to more  than  100  developing countries. 
This  means  that  Spain  will  have  to  adjust  its inter-
national  economic  relations.  The  Commission  is  studying  the 
possible  effects  on  the  Mediterranean  countries  of  Spanish, 
Greek  and  Portuguese  membership  of the  EEC. - 7  -
The  Corrununi ty  should  be  able  to  strengthen  its  ties 
with  Latin  America.  The  framework  of its future  relations with 
that part of the world will  no  doubt  take  into  account  the  level 
of development  in the countries concerned. 
In  this  regard,  it  is  interesting  that  Latin  America 
accounts  for  a  significant  proportion  of, Spain's  overseas 
investment  (See  Appendix V). 
'l'he  Spanish  population  is  younger  than  the  Community 
population  and  has  a  hig!ler  birthrate  (18.3  as  against  12.8  in 
1975  and  17.7  as  agcinst  12.4  in  1976).  Recent  UN  projections 
indicate  that Spain's population will  go  up  by  10.3%  (as against 
4.6~ in  the  Community)  between  1975  and  1985.  This will  heve  an 
effect  or.  employment  in  the  enlarged  Community,  especially  in 
view of the fact  that Spain's working population  ae  a  proportion 
of  total  population  is  on  the  increase,  even  though it is still 
lower  than  the  Community  aver·age  ( 34.9%  as  against  38.8%  in 
1976)  ( •).  According  tv  the  Corrunission  ( **}  this  proportion 
rose  by  1.1%  every  year  between  1970  and  1975,  whereas  the 
corresponding  rise  in  the  Corrununi ty  over  the  same  period  was 
only 0.33%. 
The  sole  a:!.m  of  the  very  piecemeal  observations  made 
so  far  is  to  make  it  easier  to  assess  the  importance  of  the 
novel  situation  that  will  arise  when  a  country  as  important  as 
Spain  joins  the  EEC.  In  this  respect  we  need  to  underline  the 
scale of Spain's economic  recovery drive,  its efforts  to  achieve 
stabilizaticn,  the  extent of the preparations for membership  and 
the  economic  dynamism it has displayed over  the  last few  years. 
(•)  Source 
(**)  Source 
Spanish National Statistics Institute. 
Doc.  COM(78)  200 final. - 8  -
II.  SPAIN'S  ECONOMIC  RECOVERY  DRIVE  AND  PREPARATIONS  FOR 
MEMBERSHIP  OF  THE  EEC 
After  15  years  of  vigorous  growth  (Spain's  rate  of 
growth  between  1960  and  1975  was  always  higher  than  that of the 
EEC)  Spain  has  experienced  a  sudden  slow-down  in  economic 
~xpansion,  combined with  acut~ inflation. 
Since  1977,  Spain  has  been  engaged  in carrying out  its 
policies  of  stabilization  and  reform  with  the  aim  of  radically 
transforming its economic  and  social  structure.  A  three-pronged 
attack  is being made  by  the  Government  : 
- Reform  of  the  economy;  the  battle  against  inflation,  the 
restoration of external  and  internal  balance; 
- Democra~ization of  socio-economic  relations;  move  away  from  a 
"dirigis~e"  system  to  a  system  based  on  elected  bodies  and 
collective bargaining; 
- Transformation  of  Spain's  hitherto  "nationalist"  economy  into 
an  open-frontier  economy  that  can  be  integrated  into  the  EEC 
economy. 
The  Moncloa pact  concluded  in October  1977  between  the 
Government  and  all,  parties  represented  in  Parliament  embraced 
these  three  objectives.  The  pact was  basically a  sum  of all  the 
widely different measures  that needed  to  be  taken. - 9  -
The  projects and  achievements of the  Moncloa pact 
The  Moncloa  pact  was  both  a  contract  and  a  programme 
of action.  As  a  contract,  it exemplified  the  :famous 
11consensus
11 
which  was  to  lead  the  country  towards  a  free  and  open  society, 
ready  for  Community  membership.  As  a  programme,  it set out  the 
reforms  to be  undertaken  and  the  deadlines for their implementa-
tion. 
The  consensus held :for  a  year  :  not  only  the political 
parties,  but also  the  trade  unions  and  employers'  organizations, 
although  not  formal  signatories  to  it,  have  regarded  themselves 
as  bound  by  the  pact.  Their  actions  have  proved  this.  But  at 
the  end of 1978,  the many  different election timetables reintro-
duced  the  political  debate  into  economic  and  social  relations. 
InduRtrial  disputes  have  intensified.  In  the first  two  months 
of  1979,  approximately  40  million  working  hours  were  lost  as  a 
result of strikes.  This was  the  outcome  of the positions adopted 
by  the government,  the  employers  and  the  unions. 
The  programme  itself  has  proved  much  too  ambitious. 
Many  structural  reform  projects  are  still  at  the  study,  or even 
inquiry,  stage.  This  is  the  case  with,  for  example,  the  reform 
of  labour  law,  unemployment  insurance  and  the  definition of the 
role  of  the  trade  unions  at  plant  level.  The  programme  for 
fiscal  reform  is  the  only  major  economic  project  on  which  real 
progress  has  been  made.  Some  decisions  have  been  adopted  and 
implemented,  at  least  with  regard  to  direct  taxation  {See 
Appendix  I) • - 10  -
Success against inflation 
The  essential  short-term  goal  was  to  put  the  economy 
on  a  sound  footing  and  to  check  inflation.  In this respect,  the 
results  have  hitherto  been  positive.  In  1977  inflation  was 
approaching  27•;  in  1978  it  did  not  exceed  the  targets  set  in 
the  pact,  i.e.  16  to  17%.  In  1977  the  balance-of-payments 
def'ici  t  on  currerlt  account  was  2, 500  millivn  dollars;  in  1978, 
fo~ the first  time  since  1973,  there  was  a  surplus (•).  ForP,ign 
exchange  reserves  have  risen  from  9,000  to  11,000  million 
dollars.  The  growth  in  the  money  supply  will  be  strictly  in 
line with  forecasts  (17  to  18%).  The  peseta has  risen again,  too 
much  for  the  liking  of  some  industrialist.  Finally,  and  above 
all,  wage  increases will  remain  below  the  ceilings fixed  in 1977 
(about  20%). 
The  reorganization  of  the  economy  in  1978  has  there-
fore  exceeded  expectations.  But  so  has  the price  to  be  paid,  in 
terms  of  expansion  and  employment.  It was  expected  that  unem-
ployment  would  rise  by  100,000.  The  actual  increase  was  over 
200,000  and  by  the  end  of  1978  there  were  more  than  a  million 
unemployed,  i.e.  7.5%  of  the  labour  force.  This  is  one  of  the 
highest  rates  in  Europe.  Since  the  population  of  Spain  in-
creases  by  1.1%  a  year  {apart  from  Turkey  this  is  the  highest 
rate  in  Europe),  this  situation  may  well  continue  in  the  years 
to  come. 
Pressure  on  firms 
GNP  turned  out  to  have  grown  rather  more  strongly  in 
1978  than forecast:  by 2.9. (••).  Before  the  summer,  the figure 
mentioned  was  about  1..  This  positive  performance  is  attri-
butable mainly  to agriculture  (harvests were  excellent) 
(•)  Approx~tely 500 million dollars. 
(••) Source  :  Bank ot Spain - 11  -
and  to  the  40  million  tourists  who  visited Spain.  Industry had 
no  hand  in  1 t  investment  fell  by  4%  rather  than  the  2% 
anticipated  {*).  For  some  years  now,  Spanish  industry has been 
suffering  from  domestic  disinvestment,  offset  only  by  influxes 
of foreign capital  (see  page  36  below). 
Firms  were  hard  hit  by  the  tight  monetary  policy 
pursued  by  the  Government.  Under  the  Franco  regime  they  had 
grown  accustomed  to  preferential  financing,  but  now  they  find 
themselves  under  pressure,  no  doubt  intentional,  which  forces 
them either to  tighten  up  on  management  or go  under. 
Industrialists  therefore  regard  1978  as  a  disastrous 
year  for  them.  For  several  years  past  business'  share  of  the 
national  income  has  been  falling  while  the  workers •  share  has 
been  rising.  According  to  the  information  given  to  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  Cornmi ttee  during  his visit  to  Madrid, 
between  1974  and  1978  business'  share fell  from  39  to  34%,  while 
the  workers •  share  rose  from  60  to  65%.  The  trade  unions 
themselves,  like  the  Government,  acknowledge  the  existence  of 
this  development  and  accept  that  it must  be  stopped  in order  to 
prepare for  the  future. 
A plan for  the  immediate  future 
At  the  present  stage  of  Spain's political development 
it is difficult  to  draw  up  forecasts  and  plans going  beyond  the 
immediate  future.  This  is  why  Government  economic  policy  for 
the  current  year  is again  geared  to  the  short  term.  At  first it 
tried  to  extend  for  a  further  year  the  employersworkers •  pact 
which  made  it possible  to  check  inflation  in  1978,  by  dealing 
directly  with  the  unions  and  employers  rather  than  with  the 
political parties. 
(*)  This figure  also includes  stock  movements,  substantially 
reduced  by credit restrictions. - 12  -
When  this  attempt  failed,  the  1979  economic  programme 
was  drawn  up  unilaterally by  the government.  It is an  ambitious 
programme,  designed  to  slow  down  price  increases  even  further 
(the  rate  of  increase  should  not  exceed  10%  in  order  to  bring 
Spain  into  line  with  the  Community  average)  and  stimulate 
economic  recovery  (proposed growth  rate of 4%,  a  marked  increase 
over  the  1978  figure).  The  government  approved  an  Order  in 
Council  at  the  end  of  1978  to  keep  salary  increases within  an 
!1.-14~  range,  depending  on  the  provisions  of  each  collective 
agreement. 
Both  the  unions  and  the  employers'  organizations have 
opposed  this  programme.  The  two  main  unions  (CO  and  UGT)  have 
announced  their  own  objectives  :  16%  wage  increases and  reduced 
working  hours  ( *).  In  ad.di tion,  the  main  employers'  organiza-
tion,  the  CEOE,  has  stated  that  the  government's  proposed  wage 
levels  and  the  increase  in  the  budget  deficit  will  make  it 
impossible  to  reduce  price  increases  to  10%  in  1979.  It  has 
called  for  further  negotiations  with  the  government  and  the 
unions.  The  organization  of  small  and  medium-sized  companies 
( CEPYME  and  COPYME)  have  also  voiced  their  d] sapproval.  They 
feel  that  wage  increases  should  not  exceed  10%.  They  agree 
with  the  CEOE  that  the  government  is trying to play  too  large  a 
part  in the policy of economic  recovery for the  current year and 
believe  that  the  only  solution  to  Spain's  present  economic 
stagnation is more  investment  and  private  consumption. 
(*)  According  to  the  Spanish  trade unions,  the  government  limits 
have  already been exceeded  in  some  collective  agreements. - 13  -
The  price of  trade  union  cooperation 
In  general  there  is  a  certain  feeling  of  disil-
lusionment  on  both sides of industry;  workers  and  employers  want 
more  reward  for  their  cooperation.  The  unions  in  particular 
feel  that  in  1978  their  sacrifices  have  not  been  fairly 
rewarded.  Far  from  falling,  unemployment  has  got  worse,  social 
security  is  no  better  than  before  and  they  have  not  really been 
involved  in  framing  economic  and  social  policy.  In short  their 
faith  in  cooperation  has  been  shaken.  It  takes  time  to  change 
the  habits  of  an  administration  accustomed  to  flexing  its 
muscles.  As  recently  as  November  1978,  the  minimum  wage  was 
increased  without  the  workers'  representatives  being  consulted 
or  even  informed.  This  occurred  at  the  very  time  they  were 
negotiating with  the  Government  on  the  1979  programme.  The  same 
thing  happened  when  the  proposals  were  being  drawn  up  for  the 
"workers's charter"  and  trade  union  action. 
If  its  incomes  policy  is  to  succeed,  the  Government 
will  have  to  make  genuine  concessions  to  the  unions  ( *).  It 
must  also  act  more  positively  on  unemployment.  Its  declared 
intention  at  the  moment  is  to  create  150,000  ne  in  1979.  Given 
the  increase  in  the  labour  force,  unemployment  will  continue  to 
rise. 
In  spite  of  everything,  there  is  evidence  of  a  shift 
in  priori  ties.  In  1978  everything  took  second  place  to  the 
:fight  against  inflation.  Prices  were  the  focus  of  attention. 
This  year  some  stimulus will  also have  to  be  given  to  economic 
( *)  For example,  the  return of property confiscated by the Franco 
regime  has  been  mooted.  The  Minister  for  Labour  recently 
made  a  press  statement  saying  that  he  thought  trade  union 
property  would  not  be  restored,  but  that  the  representative 
unions  would  be  "endowed"  with  certain  property.  This 
implies  the  non-recognition  of  the  right  of  those  unions 
which existed before  1939  to have  their confiscated property 
returned. - 14  -
activity.  Greater  emphasis  has  to  be  given  to  unemployment.  If 
the  employment  situation  does  not  improve  in  1979,  plans will  be 
revised.  A  counter-cyclical  action  fund  is  provided  for  this 
purpose  in  the  draft  Budget.  A  programme  of  public  investments 
is  to  be  launched  straightaway  to  help  the  construction  and 
public  works  sector,  with  the  hope  that  this would  stimulate pri-
vate  inves-::n1ent.  Government  forecasts  put  1,;he  real  increase  in 
public  and  priva-te  investment  in  1979  at  8%.  Coupled  with  wage 
restraint,  this  turnaround  should  play  a  crucial  role  in  achie-
ving  success.  But it is still very far  from  being  a  certainty at 
this  stage. 
Obligations of EEC  membership 
3eyond  the  immediate  prospects,  membership  of  the  EEC 
will  necessarily  involve  many  obligations  for  Spain;  their full 
import  is  of  course,  still  an  unknown  quantity,  not  only  for  the 
general  public,  but  also for  the  country's  leaders.  Considerable 
efforts  are  being  made  to  speed  up  the  changes.  Spain  is  the 
only  European  country  to  have  a  ministry  responsible  for  Commu-
nity  affa~rs,  and  this  ministry  has  embarked  on  a  massive 
nation-wide  information  campaign.  Meetings  are  organized  syste-
matically  ~n  all  major  towns.  These  meetings  have  demonstrated 
just  how  poorly  the  real  problems  of  Community  membership  are 
understood. 
The  Civil  Service  itself  operates  on  the  basis  of  a 
nationalis~  approach  and  state  control  of  the  economy  and  has  to 
be  converted  to  the  European  idea.  An  interministerial group  has 
been  set  up  "to  ensure  that  national  laws  and  regulations  evolve 
in  a  direction  compatible  with  Community  legislation.  All  issues 
submitted  ~o  the  Spanish Cabinet  are first  examined  by  the  group. - 15  -
This  is  a  sign  of  the  willingness  evident  at  the  top  to  steer 
the  country  towards  membership  in  earnest.  But  the  experience 
of the  Common  Market  teaches us  that changes  of this kind  take  a 
lot of time. 
A  review is being  made  of the  changes  which  membership 
will  involve,  partly  in  order  to  enable  finalization  of  the 
"industrial restructuring plan"  announced  for  the  end  of 1978  in 
the  Moncloa  Pact.  Since  this  deadline  could  not  be  met, 
objective  data  are  not  yet  available  on  the  real  impact  of  a 
complete  opening  of  the  frontiers.  What  is  becoming  increa-
singly clear is that  these  effects will  be  considerable. 
Two  of  the  changes  most  frequently  mentioned  by 
businessmen  as  a  requirement  for  EEC  membership  are  labour 
mobility  and  the  financing  of social  security  through  taxes  (see 
page  22).  The  official  statistics  indicate  that  at  the  moment 
the  State  bears  only  3%  of  the  cost  of  social  security  dis-
bursements.  The  bulk  is  financed  by  industry,  and  is  a  con-
straint  on  employment  since  it increases  labour costs  and  makes 
it more  expensive  to  create  jobs.  There  is consequently  a  move 
to  increase  the  State  contribution  from  9%  in  1979  to  20%  in 
1983.  State  financing  of  unemployment  insurance  is  also  to  be 
phased  in. 
All  this  implies  an  increase  in  public  expenditure, 
and  thus  in  public  revenue.  There  are  consequently plans for  a 
major  tax  reform  which  will  alter  the  tax-paying  practices  and 
ethics  of  Spaniards  and  Spanish  firms.  As  far as  EEC  membership 
is  concerned,  the  most  signficant  change  will  be  the  introduc-
tion  of  VAT.  This  is  scheduled  for  1983  but  the possibility of 
postponing  it has  been  raised  in  Madrid  because  of  the  growing 
realization of the scale of the practical difficulties involved. Taken  together, 
kind  of  revolution.  And, 
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these  radical  changes  constitute  a 
not  suprisingly,  they  make  industry 
feel  somewhat  uncertain,  as witness  its unwillingness  to  invest. 
Despite  the  new  constitution,  businessmen  are not  sure  what  sort 
of society Spain will  have  in  ten years. 
This  may  be  why  the  business  world  attachfls  so  much 
importance  to  EEC  membership.  It  is  looked  on  as  an  anchor,  a 
guarantee  that  Spain  will  evolve  within  the  framework  of  a 
market  economy  which  is open  to  the  outside  world. 
Revival  of  the  trade  unions  and  employers'  federation 
in Spain 
Spain  has  a  long  tradition  of  free  association. 
Workers'  and  employers'  organizations  existed  in  Spain  before 
1936.  The  socialist-inspired  UGT  was  set  up  at  the  end  of  the 
19th century.  However,  for  40  years  the  existing movements  were 
abolished  under  Franco  and  replaced  by  a  single  organization  to 
which  both  employers  and  employees  had  to  belong  and  pay 
contributions.  This  organization,  which  was  divided  into  em-
ployer and  worker  sections,  with sectoral  and  regional  branches, 
had  sole  responsibility for all  labour problems. 
It  was  in  fact  a  government  institution and  acted as 
the  intermediary  of  the  State  in  fixing  salaries  and  working 
conditions.  Companies  could  not  go  beyond  the  standards  it 
established without  the  authorization of the Ministry of Labour. - 17  -
This  situation  began  to  change  in  the  1960 1 s  and  the 
beginning  of  the  1970
1 s.  In  many  companies,  "workers  1  commit-
tees  were  formed.  In  the  last  years  of the  Franco  regime,  they 
played  an  important  role  and  even  signed  collective  agreements 
with  some  companies.  Other  federations  (such  as  the Catholic-
inspired  USO)  were  also  formed  during  the  last  years  of'  t.he 
Franco  government. 
But  after 1SI76,  there were  some  fundamental  changes  in 
labour  relations.  In  the  last  three  years,  there  has  been  a 
revival  of  free  associations,  which  have  been  legally  recog-
nized,  and  a  whole  new  body of labour  law  has  been  drafted. 
The  right  of  association  was  recognized  by  a  law 
passed  in April  1977.  This  law  allowed  employers  and  workers  to 
form  regional  and  national  professional  associations  in  each 
branch  of  activity  to  uphold  their  respective  interests.  Two 
months  later,  the  obligation  to  pay  contributions  to  the 
official organization was  abolished.  This  organization had also 
been  transformed  into  an  administrative  department  in  October 
1976:  the  department  of  social  and  professional  services,  or 
AISS,  which  employs  the  former  officials  of  the  old  organiza-
tion,  who  number  several  thousand,  and  has  taken  over  its 
assets. - 18  -
Thus,  new  trade unions  and  employers'  federations  have 
developed 
a)  Employers'  federation 
After  several  organizations  had  ~ried  to  achieve 
recognition,  the  employers'  groups  were  united  in  September  1977 
into  the  Spanish  Confederation  of  Employers'  Organizations 
(CEOE),  which  now  has  47  professional  federations  and  48 
territorial  associations.  The  CEOE  is  now  a  ~ruly  representa-
tive  organization  in  economic  and  social  terms.  There  are  also 
two  federations  of small- and  medium-sized  companies,  COPYME  and 
CEPYME.  The  CEOE  groups  together  regional  inter-professional 
associations,  some  of  which  - such  as  those  in Catalonia or  the 
Basque  region  - have  a  great  deal  of influence. 
b)  Workers'  organizations 
There  are  now  about  ten  such  organiza:ions,  some  of 
which  are  only  regional. 
The  Study  Group  on  Spain  of  the  Section  for  External 
Relations  has  had  meetings with  three  trade  union  organizations, 
which  were  chosen  on  the  basis  of  the  trade  union  election 
results  in  1978  (CCOO  :  37.8%,  UGT  :  31%,  USO  :  5.9%). 
- CCOO  :  Workers' Committees, which  began  in  the  1960's as works 
councils;  their  leaders  are  affiliated  with  the  Communist 
party. - 19  -
- UGT  :  General  Union  of  Wor~ers,  which  was  founded  in  1888  and 
became  a  clandestine  organization  during  the  Franco  period;  it 
is affiliated with  the  Socialist party. 
USO  :  Workers'  Trade  Union,  which  split  off  from  the  UGT  in 
1960,  with  a  partial  reunifica~ion  in  1977;  it says it has  no 
official  affiliation  with  any  political  party,  although  it 
seems  to  be  close  to  the  government. 
All  of  these  trade  union  organizations  have  said  they 
are  in  favour  of  Spain's  joining  the  Community.  They  are 
establishing  closer  relations  with  the  Community  workers'  orga-
nizations.  But  the  Spanish  union  organizations  have  not  yet 
taken  a  stand  on  the  major  social  problems  arising  from 
Community  enlargement  (free  movement,  employment)  or  on  the 
aoaptation of Spanish  labour  law  ~c  the  laws  of the  Community. 
There  has  also  been  a  movement  to  form  a  manager-
ial staff organization  in  Spain  for  some  time.  While  the  exis-
ting  trade  unions  (particularly  the  CCOO  and  the  UGT)  are  trying 
to  recruit  members  among  this  growing  category  of  workers,  a 
Spanish  confederation  of  managerial  staff is  in  the  process  of 
being  formed.  This  confederation,  independent  of  the  other 
organizations,  would  group  together  the  4  existing associations 
of managerial  and  technical  staff. 
As  far  as  agriculture  is  concerned,  the  large  number 
of  national  and  regional  farming  associations  that  have  sprung 
up  since  1977  makes  it  difficul  't  for  representatives  of  the 
farming  community  to  participate  in  the  formulation  of agricul-
tural  policy.  The  recently  elected  Chambers  of  Agriculture, 
whose  task  is  to  represent  the  whole  of the  agricultural  sector 
vis-a-vis  the  Government,  are  independent  both  from  the  unions 
and political parties. - 20  -
Democratization of industrial  relations 
The  drafting  of  new  social  legislation  corresponding 
to  the  existence  of  independent  bodies  of employers  and  workers 
has  been  a  slower  process  than  the  revival  of  the  trade  unions 
and  employers'  organizations. 
The  situation  is  at  present  evolving  rapidly  and 
industrial  relations practices are still not  to  be  compaz'ed  with 
those  in  the  EEC.  Both  employers  and  trade  unions  believe  that 
the  government  must  stop  running  industrial  relations  and  be 
content with  the  role of arbitrator.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
employers  are  unwilling  to  commit  themselves  to  a  collective 
bargaining  policy  before  a  legal  framework  exists.  This  is 
because  they consider trade  unions  to  be  too  politicized. 
The  trade  unions  share  this  view  that  the  absence  of 
legislation  is  a  hindrance  to  the  development  of  a  policy  on 
collective  bargaining.  (The  problem  derives  from  the  fact  that 
existing  laws  on  trade  unions  date  back  to  1945,  so  that  there 
is  a  legal  vacuum;  moreover  the  tradition of State  intervention 
in industrial relations  is  far  from  dead).  The  unions  feel  that 
the  Government's  plan  on  industrial  relations  has  been  worked 
out without  sufficient consultations  and  predominantly under  the 
influence  of  the  employers. 
Both  sides  find  the  situation  difficult,  especially 
because  there  are  no  "rules  of  the  game"  whereby  their  various 
aspirations  can  be  properly channelled. prices, 
industry. 
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An  additional  problem  is  the  lack  of statistics  - on 
pay  and  employment  acceptable  to  both  sides  of 
Figures  published  by  the  Government  are  discredited 
as  a  hang-over  from  the  ancient  regime  and  are  disregarded. 
Figures  published  by  the  banks  and  financial  institutions  are 
quoted  more  frequently,  even  by  the  unions.  But  they  lack  an 
objective  point  of  reference.  Fortunately,  the  Moncloa Pact  has 
made  provisions  to  provide  just  such  a  reference  - at  least for 
prices  - in  the  form  of  a  new  cost  of  living  index,  which  is to 
be  established  with  the  help  of  employers'  organizations,  trade 
unions  and  consumer  associations. 
A  lot  of  legislation  has  been  adopted  since  1976 
(industrial  relations  law  of  April  1976,  decree  on  labour 
relations  of  March  1977,  etc.).  But  it  takes  a  lot  of  time  to 
draft  and  pass  new  legislation,  and  when  confronted with  the  gap 
between  these  texts  and  reality,  employers  and  employees  often 
have  to  invent  their own  new  industrial  relations. 
This  is  true,  for  example,  of  staff  representation. 
The  bill  providing  for  trade  union  branches  to  be  set  up  in 
companies  employing  more  than  1,000  people  has  still  not  been 
passed.  In  fact,  however,  union  branches  already  exist  in  a 
number  of  companies,  even  the  smaller  ones  (the  employers  are 
apprehensive  at  seeing  politics  enter  industrial  life  in  this 
way). - 22  -
Under  the  Franco  regime,  members  of  the official union 
were  allowed  to  spend  a  maximum  of 40  hours  a  month  on official 
union  activity.  A  large  number  of  companies  thus  continue  to 
apply  this old  law,  although it has  officially been  rescinded. 
New  laws  have  also not  yet  been  adopted  concerning  the 
gen~ral working  conditions  in  ~ompanies.  But  collective  agree-
ments  are  now  being signed at province  level.  Many  companies  are 
also  en-cering  into  prjvate  agreements,  which  generally  of'fer 
much  more  favourable  terms  than  those  of'  the  province-level 
agreement. 
Labour  mobility  is another  unsolved  problem.  Dismis-
sals are  now  prohibited  in principle.  This  is  one  legacy  of'  the 
Franco  regime  which  the  trade  unions  did  not  want  the  Monc loa 
Pact  to  change.  Some  companies,  particularly  the  small- and 
medium-sized  enterprises,  are  therefore  likely  to  go  bankrupt, 
since  they  cannot  obtain  the  requisite  authorizations  for 
dismissals  on  economic  grounds  f'rom  the  very  slow-moving  govern-
ment  machinery. - 23  -
The  question of  dismissals  is  inseparable  from  that  of 
the  reorganization  of  employment  departments  and,  above  all, 
from  the  reorganization of unemployment  benefits.  The  unemploy-
ment  benefits  system  still  leaves  much  to  be  desired  and  the 
trade  unions  have  worked  out  ~hat only  35%  of those  actually out 
of  work  are  covered;  there  is  also  supposed  to  be  hidden 
unemployment  in  agriculture,  with  about  150,000  people  not 
receiving any  benefits. 
It  is  evident  that  some  labour  mobility  must  be 
introduced  into  the  Spanish  economy  as  Spain  becomes  integrated 
into  the  EEC.  The  comple~e  opening  up  of  frontiers  will 
necessitate  radical  structural  changes  and,  consequently 
labour  shedding  as  well  as  factory  closures.  It must,  however, 
be  stressed  that  in  the  EEC  countries,  labour  mobility  and  the 
right  of  dismissal  are  being  more  and  more  restr·icted  by  social 
policy  and  the  extension  of  laws  on  employment  contracts,  as 
well  as  by  inadequacies  in  areas  such  as  housing  and  vocational 
training. 
In  spite  of  all  the  difficulties  and  delays,  in-
dustrial  relations  in  Spain  are  evolving  and  falling  into  line 
with  those  in  the  other  European  democracies.  In  spite  of  the 
problems  they  have  encountered  and  although  they  were  estab-
lished  only  recently,  the  employers'  organizations  are  now  an 
important  factor  in Spain's  economic  and  social  life.  The  trade 
union  movement  is  now  a  vital  force  and  its  pluralistic 
structure,  far  from  causing  confusion,  has  produced  a  balance 
among  the  various  interest groups. - 24  -
The  representative  nature  of  the  employers'  orga-
nizations  and  the  trade  unions  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  they 
were  both  invited  to  participate  by  the  government  in  the 
attempt  to  draw  up  an  economic  pact  for  1979  (whereas  the  1978 
Moncloa  Pact  had  been  discussed  only  by  the  government  and  the 
political  parties).  The  consul tat  ions  at  the  end  of  last  year 
did  not  result  in  an  immediate  agreement.  But  they  will 
continue  in  the  coming  months  and will pave'the way  for  new  laws 
which  will  enable  industrial  relations  to  develop  in  an  atmos-
phere  of  freedom. 
Application of  the  Moncloa Pact  in industrial  restructuring 
While  the  Moncloa  Pact  has  had  a  rapid  effect  in 
reducing  inflation  in  Spain,  the  structural  reforms  it provided 
for  have  generally  not  been  adopted  within  the  prescribed 
time-limits,  except  for  the  tax  reform  which  is  largely  under 
way. 
Several  measures  have  already been  adopted  in  the  area 
of direct  taxation.  The  personal  income  tax  and  the  corporation 
tax  have  been  in  force  since  1  January  1979.  The  basic  rate for 
companies  is 33%. - 25  -
The  reform  of  indirect  taxation  :  pending  the  intro-
duction of value  added  tax,  the  government  is planning  to  pass  a 
law  setting  up  a  provisional  indirect  taxation  system,  which 
will  amend  the  present  surtax  on  company  transactions  and  the 
luxury  tax. 
Measures  have  been  adopted  to  ensure  better supervi-
sion  of  the  social  security  budget  and  benefits.  In  practice, 
however,  there  are  still problems  with  regard  to  the  employers' 
contributions.  The  measures  needed  to  make  the  collection  of 
social  security  contributions  and  the  supervision  of  the  whole 
system more  effective are still at  the  discussion  stage  (*). 
The  industrial  restructuring  plan  r-eferred  to  by  the 
pact  in  general  terms  nas  -1i therto  been  1 imi ted  r:o  ~he  ~nergy 
and  fisheries  sectors.  'rhe  government  approved  proposals  on 
chese  two  areas  on  2  May  1978,  i.:>ut  Parliament  has  not  yet 
aecided  on  them.  (A  table  showing  :he  proposed  timetable  of' 
measures  and  their present  status ls appended  to  this document) • 
.  Structural  adaptation of Spanish industry  in anticipation of 
EEC  membership 
The  problems  wnicn  this  adaptation  will  inevi  taDly 
:~ause  do  not  seem  to  have  oeen  seriously analysed  in  Spa1n.  The 
~"1in1stry  for  European  Affairs  undertook  a  survey  on  the  subject 
~f EEC  membership  at meetings  organized  throughout  the  country 
( *)  ·rhe  social security budgets  for  1979  were  analysed  on 
this point at  the  end of 1978. - 26  -
between  October  and  December  1978.  The  various  groups  con-
cerned,  both employers  and  employees,  were  able  to  express  their 
views  on  that  occasion.  But  there  is  still  mo~e  immediate 
concern  over  the  domestic  recession  and  the  political  develop-
ment  of  the  country  than  over  Spain's  future  membership  in  the 
Community. 
Studies  are  being  carried  out  in  various  sectors  of 
industry  ( *).  The  results  of  these  studies  are  apparently  not 
yet  available.  and  the  Study  Group  is  not  familiar  with  them. 
The  following  indications  on  some  of  the  main  branches  of 
Spanish  industry  are  derived  in  particular  from  Community  trade 
organizations. 
Textile  industry 
Catalonia; 
sllk)  are 
Two-thirds  of  the  industry  are  concentrated  in 
three-quarters  of  three  sub-sectors  (cotton.  wool, 
also  concentrated  in  that  region.  Several  hundred 
companies  have  been  wiped  out  in  recent  years  following  re-
struc~uring measures. 
The  textile  industry  employs  about  275,000  people.  The 
average  number  of  employees  per  company  is  50  ( 75  in  the  EEC) 
and  ~he  average  number  of units of production  per  compaDy  is 450 
(800  in  the  EEC). 
(*)  166 - 27  -
As  regards  the  technological  level,  if the figure  100 
is  taken  to  represent  a  leading  company,  the  average  figure for 
Spain  would  be  85,  whilst  the  EEC  would  be  at  90  and  West 
Germany at 95. 
Using  Spanish sources,  given  a  base  of 100  (definition 
unknown),  the  man-hour  cost  would  be  214  in  Spain,  276  in  the 
EEC,  United Kingdom  and  Belgium,  310 for West  Germany  and  367  in 
Denmark. 
The  Appendix  (Appendix  III)  analyses  the  textile trade 
between  the  EEC  and  Spain.  These  figures  show  that  the  EEC  is 
Spain's  most  important  foreign  market  for  textiles and  accounts 
for about half of Spanish  textile exports. 
The  Spanish  industry leaders feel  that  the prospect of 
EEC  membership  will  have  certain  negative  aspects  for  the 
textile  industry  in  Spain  :  Spanish  companies  are  smaller  and 
productivity lower  than  in  the  EEC,  the  Spanish  fashion  image  is 
less  well-known  and  employment  regulations  are  rigid.  However, 
they  are  counting  on  the  dynamic  effect  of  membership  (larger 
Community  markets  with  the  elimination  of  import  quotas). 
Whatever  the  unknown  factors  of  EEC  membership  and  the 
expectations  arising  from  it  may  be,  the  Spanish  textile 
industry  leaders  feel  they will  be  better  equipped  to  overcome 
their problems within the  EEC  than outside it (*). 
They  are  therefore  in  favour  of  EEC  membership, 
provided that it is a  gradual  process with transitional measures 
to miniaize  the difficulties for both Spain and  the  Community. 
(*)  Nonetheless,  they have  expressed  their dissatisfaction 
over the  Community quotas allotted to  them  under  the 
~ti-~ibre Arrangement. - 28  -
The  government  does  not  wish  to  intervene  directly.  Its inten-
tion  seems  to  be  to  leave  the  responsibility  for  restructuring 
to  the  industry  and  to  employers  and  labour. 
Footwear  Industry 
Spain's  production  (126.6  million  pairs  in  1977)  puts 
it  in  seventh  position  in  the  world production  table,  and  third 
among  the  OECD  countries. 
The  manufacturing  plant  is  somewhat  old  and  the 
factories  are  generally  small  (only  15  enterprises,  accounting 
for  60%  of  production,  employ  more  than  250  workers).  Foreign 
investment  is very  rare,  mostly  coming  from  North  America. 
Despite  a  fall  of  10%  in  1977,  Spanish  exports  of 
footwear  accounted  for  45%  of  production  (imports  being  very 
low);  this  makes  footwear  second  only  to  motor  vehicles  among 
Spain's  exports.  Exports  are  mainly  to  North  America  - 51.4% 
(of which  47.4%  to  the  United States)  -and the  EEC  (36.7%).  But 
while  exports  to  the  United  States  fell  by  16%  in  1977  compared 
with  1976,  those  to  the  EEC  fell  by  only  2%. 
There  is  a  twofold  threat  to  Spanish  exports  :  compe-
tition  from  Italy  (on  account  of  advances  in  technology  in this 
country),  from  Brazil  and  from  South  Korea;  and  the  reduction of 
the American  market.  Furthermore,  the  Spanish  footwear  industry 
also  has  problems  as  regards  raw-material  supplies,  in  common 
with  the  footwear  industries in other European  countries. - 29  -
The  Spanish customs duty of 26.2%  (*)  on  leather foot-
wear  is a  real barrier to EEC  exports. 
Chemicals  Industry 
On  the  basis  of  the  number  of  persons  e~loyed 
(approximately  140,000  at  the  end  of  1976),  the  Spanish  chemi-
cals  industry  is  the  fifth largest  in Europe  and  the  seventh in 
the  world  (after  the  United  States,  West  Germany,  Japan,  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Italy). 
It  has  more  than  doubled  its  turnover  in  three  years 
{ 1976/73),  although  its  rate  of  growth  is  slowing  down.  With 
11.5%  of  GNP  it is the  second  most  important  industrial  sector 
after construction. 
The  main  producers  (1976  figures)  are  :  UERT  - Union 
Explosivos  Rio  Tinto  (62,300  million  pesetas;  13,450 employees; 
45th  in  the  world;  diversified  operations),  Michelin  Espagne 
(20,400  million  pesetas;  11,300  employees;  tyres),  La  Papelera 
Espanola  (17,800  million  pesetas;  6,075  employees;  paper),  CROS 
(16,400  million  pesetas;  4,430  employees;  fertilizers), 
Firestone  Hispania  (13,300  million  pesetas;  6,480  employees; 
tyres). 
The  Spanish  chemicals  industry  also  includes  numerous 
small- and  medium-sized  enterprises  (in  1976,  out  of  8,000 
enterprises in this sector,  45%  employed  not  more  than  5  and  8~ 
not  more  than  25  workers).  Utilization  of production  capacity 
is about  80%  on  average. 
{*)  Reduced  in April  1979  (see  comments  below). - 30  -
There  is large-scale foreign  investment  (West  Germany, 
United  States,  France,  Switzerland,  Great  Britain}.  Foreign 
capital  controls  7  of  the  14  biggest  chemicals  companies  in 
Spain,  especially those  manufacturing  rubber  and  tyres  (Michelin, 
Firestone,  Pirelli,  Dunlop}.  However,  the  proportion  of  invest-
ment  financed  by  foreign capital would  seem  to  be  falling. 
Spain's  balance  of  trade  in  chemical  products  is  in 
deficit  (in  recent  years  the  cover  rate  has  been  about  40%,  but 
nearly  50%  in  1977  (II)).  Its  main  customers  are  the  United 
States  (8.7%  of  Spanish  exports),  France  (5.9%)  and  West  Germany 
(5%}.  Its  main  suppliers  are  West  Germany  (14%  of  Spanish 
imports),  France  (11%)  and  the  United  States  (10%).  In  total  the 
EEC  supplies  (1977)  46%  of  Spanish  imports  and  receives  18%  of 
its exports. 
To  take  just  one  example,  the  chemicals  industry  in 
Catalonia  (one-third  of  the  Spanish  chemicals  industry)  believes 
that  it will  have  to  make  major  structural  changes  irrespective 
of  whether  Spain  joins  ~he  Common  Market  or  not  (size  of 
enterprises,  new  technology,  industrial  investment,  etc.).  How-
ever,  membership  of  the  EEC  could  help  fix  guidelines,  speed  up 
technical  changes  already  in  progress,  provide  new  commercial 
opportunities.  Whatever  the  circumstances,  and  however  much 
effort  is  needed,  the  Ca~alonian chemicals  industry  thinks  that 
first  and  foremost  it  must  operate  in  its  natural  geopolitical 
area,  i.e.  Western  Europe  and,  more  particularly,  the  Common 
r.farket. - 31  -
The  industry  itself  forecasts  annual  growth  rates 
between  now  and  1980  of  6.5%  for consumption,  7%  for production, 
6%  for  imports  and  11%  for exports. 
A  close  watch  should  be  kept  on  developments  in  the 
Spanish  man-made  fibres  industry  and  foreign  investment  in Spain 
following  the  agreement  between  Community  producers  on  the 
restriction of capacity and State aid. 
Motor Vehicle  Industry 
This  industry  is  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of 
penetration  by  foreign  companies.  Spain  manufactures  about  one 
million  cars  a  year  which  makes  it  the  eighth  largest  manufac-
turer in Europe  and  the  tenth largest  in  the  world.  The  country's 
motor vehicle  industry is largely  in  the  hands  of five  companies. 
Motor vehicles  top  the  list of Spanish experts. 
Figures for  1978  are as  follows 
Production  Domestic  market  Exports 
No.  of  1978/77  No.  of  1978/77  No.  of  ~978/77 
Vehicles  %  Vehicles  %  Vehicles  % 
SEAT  (Fiat)  284,480  - 17.9  213,889  - 10.4  86.692  +  34.0 
Ford  260,939  +  22.4  57,334  - 12.3  182,753  +  22.5 
Fasa-Renault  235,329  +  4.9  176,814  +  0.4  56.944  +  14.6 
Citroen  106.434  - 1.7  77,800  - 1.0  28,536  +  3.8 
Chrysler  (*)  98,934  +  2.6  78,852  +  7.5  18,656  - 19.1 
(*)  Now  part of the Peugeot-Citroen Group. - 32  -
These  figures  show  how  Ford,  which  only  builds  one 
model  in  Spain  (the  Ford  Fiesta)  is catching up  on  SEAT.  In  1977 
Ford's  production  in  Spain  was  equivalent  to  only  62%  of  SEAT's 
production.  The  corresponding  figure  for  1978  is  92%.  Ford  is 
now  the  leading  Spanish  exporter. 
Spanish  exports  of  motor  vehicles  is  mainly  to  France 
(c.  45%  of total  1977  exports),  Italy  (in excess  of  10%),  and  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (less  than  10%).  Spanish  imports  of 
motor  vehieles  are  very  limited. 
The  aim  behind  the  provisions  governing  the  motor 
vehicle  sector  in  Spain  which  were  in  force  until  4  April  1979 
(*)  was  that  there  should  be  a  high degree  of integration of this 
industry  in  the  domestic  economy  and  that  the  country  should 
endeavour  to  become  self-sufficient  in  the  manufacture  of  motor 
vehicles.  This  generally  led  to  the  manufacture  of vehicles  on  a 
small  scale.  In  order  to  meet  the  requirements  of  Spanish 
customers,  however,  all  the  manufacturers,  with  the  exception of 
Ford  (which  has  not  been  operating  in  Spain  for  as  long  as  the 
other  companies),  were  obliged  gradually  to  diversify  their 
ranges  of vehicles.  This  required  considerable  investment. 
The  new  policy  drawn  up  in  Madrid  is  aimed  at  gearing 
Spanish motor  vehicle production  in  future  (**)  to  exports.  This 
(*)  Royal  Decree  No.  816/1979  of  4  April  1979  on  the  reorganiza-
tion  of  the  industrial  sector  of  motor  vehicle  production 
specifies  a  degree  ot  integration  (proportion  of  domestic 
supplies  in  the  final  product)  of at  least  60%  in  the  case 
of  manufacturers  operating  in  Spain  before  1972  and  55%  in 
other cases  (Ford). 
(**)  The  same  Royal  Decree  stipulates  that  the  value  of  exports 
of  motor  vehicles  and  parts  by  each  manufacturer  operating 
in  Spain  before  1972  must  be  20%  greater  than  i~s  imports. 
It must  be  50%  greater  in  the  case  of manufacturers  who  have 
been  operating  in  Spain  since  1972.  In  addition,  motor 
vehicle  exports  must  account  for  2/3  of  annual  production 
(in units). - 33  -
means  that  there  will  have  to  be  a  switch  to  specialized 
manufacture  on  a  larger  scale.  Each  manufacturer  will  therefore 
have  to  reduce  the  range of vehicles it builds  in Spain  and  bring 
in  imported  vehicles  to  make  up  the  gaps  in  its  range.  These 
changes  should  prepare  the  Spanish  motor  vehicle  industry  for 
competition  from  foreign manufacturers,  including  those  of the  EC 
countries. 
When  Spain  joins  the  Community,  the  transitional period 
should  make  it  possible  to  achieve  a  balance  between  the 
interests  of  those  EC  vehicle  manufacturers  who  are  already 
established  in  Spain  and  those  who  are  not  established  in  that 
country.  It  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  EC  vehicle 
exporters  to  see  Spanish  customs  duties  on  vehicles  from  third 
countries dismantled quickly. 
Current  developments  in  the  Spanish  motor  vehicle 
industry include  the  following  : 
- a  reorganization  of  SEAT,  the  leading  Spanish  manufacturer  in 
which  FIAT  have  a  36%  holding  and  INI  a  34%  holding,  is  now 
taking place after a  period of serious difficulties; 
-Ford is reported.to  have  reduced  its demands  in its talks with 
the  Spanish  Government  on  its application  for authorization to 
expand  its  manufacturing  base  in  Spain.  It  wants  to  be 
perm! tted  to  increase  its  share  of  the  Spanish  market  beyond 
the  10~ limit which  has hitherto applied; 
- General  Motors  is  reported  to  have  plans  to  set  up  a  plant  to 
manufacture  a  range  of  vehicles  with  small- and  medium-sized 
engines,  specially  designed  for  the  European  market,  at  a  cost 
of  approximately  700  million  dollars.  This  could  lead  to  the 
direct creation of 10,000  new  jobs. - 34  -
Considerable  changes  are  therefore  taking  place  in  the 
Spanish  motor  vehicle  industry  with  a  view  to  Spanish membership 
of  the  Community.  The  initiative  is,  however,  largely  in  the 
hands  of  foreign  companies.  Even  in  the  goods  vehicle market  the 
INI  seems  to  want  to  cede  its  interests  to  private  investors. 
From  a  general  point  of  view  the  Spanish  trade  unions  would 
seem  to  no  longer  have  any  major  objections  to  the  policy  being 
pursued. 
Shipbui ldih'g 
Spain's  shipbuilding  industry  is  the  third  largest  in 
the  world  ( 1977  figures).  It  has  thus  overtaken  West  Germany, 
France  and  ~he United Kingdom.  In  1977,  the  rate of capacity use 
was  still  70%.  In  1978,  it fell  below  50%. 
Spain  has  some  35  shipyards.  But  the  three  largest 
companies  (in  which  INI  is  a  majority  shareholder  ( *))  account 
for  three-quarters  of the  industry's  turnover.  There  are practi-
cally  no  im;Jorts,  but  exports  grew  steadily  from  1973  to  1976. 
In  1976,  exports  increased  by  28%  (in value),  but  dropped  by  18% 
in  1977. 
Aid  measures  have  been  studied  to  deal  with  the  crisis 
in shipbuild:ng.  A  programme  to  reorganize  the  shipping  industry 
has  been  drawn  up,  which  should  help  to  maintain  the  shipyards' 
activity.  Some  companies  will  benefit  from  military  contracts. 
Nevertheless  a  large  proportion  of  the  shipbuilding  industry 
will  have  to  be  redeveloped  in  order  to  find  new  markets  (for 
example  in offshore oil rigs).  Productive  capacity will  probably 
be  reduced  by  40%. 
(*)  BAZAN  (100%),  ASTANO  (60%),  AESA  (50%). - 35  -
Energy 
The  energy  sector  is also  being  reorganized.  Up  until 
now,  there  has  been  less  reaction  in  Spain  to  the  energy  crisis 
than  in  most  other  countries  in  Europe.  The  consumption  of 
energy  per  unit  of  production  is  one  of  the  highest  among  the 
OECD  countries.  Oil,  which  made  up  35%  of  the  country's  energy 
supplies  in  the  early  1960's,  now  accounts  for  60-65".  Coal 
production  satisfied  40%  of  energy  requirements  15 years  ago but 
now  only accounts  for  15%.  Natural  gas  accounts  for only  2"  (the 
European  average is 16"). 
A  new  energy  policy  is  thus  essential.  In  May,  1978, 
the  government  approved  a  10-year plan  aimed at conserving energy 
and  diversifying  the  sources  of  supply.  But  this  programme  has 
not  yet  been  approved  by  Parliament.  The  public  debate  on  the 
subject  shows  that  there  are  still  differences  of  opinion  and 
that  the  programme will  have  to  be  amended  before it is adopted. 
The  present  plan  is designed  to  reduce oil  imports  and 
increase  the  proportion  of  national  energy  sources  and  nuclear 
energy  (at  present  nuclear  energy  makes  up  2%  of  the  energy 
requirements;  this  proportion  would  increase  to  15%  in  1987  AND 
THAT  OF  OIL  TO  59").  The  plan  also  provides  for  an  increase  in 
energy  prices,  which  are  currently  well  below  the  European 
average  (20%  lower  than  the  lowest  prices  in Europe). - 36  -
There  is  a  state  monopoly  over  oil  distribution,  and 
the  Commission  will  have  to  study  the  requirements  for adapting 
it to  the  Treaty provisions. 
The  country's  uranium  resources  represent  one  of  the 
positive  aspects  of  the  energy  picture:  the  government  estimates 
that  natural  uranium  resources  will  supply  40%  of  the  nuclear 
industry's  requirements  in 1982. 
The  impact  of  energy  costs  on  the  Spanish  balance  of 
payments  was  analyzed  in  the  Commission  Opinion of November  1978. 
Banking  system 
The  monetary  authorities'  restrictive  credit  policy 
tends  to  bring about  structural  changes  by  way  of the pressure it 
brings  to  bear  on  the  banks.  The  banking  sector  in  Spain  is 
still  widely  dispersed:  there  are  108  commercial  and  industrial 
banks.  Some  of  them  have  run  into  difficulties  and  in  some 
cases,  the  Bank  of Spain has  intervened  to  support  them. - 37  -
A  process  of  concentration  has  also  begun,  with  the 
smaller  and  medium- sized  banks  disappearing.  Finally,  there 
have  been  a  number  of  mergers  (e.g.  Banco  Iberico  with  Banco 
Central).  There  were  far  fewer  new  branches  opening  up  in  1978 
( 25%  less  than  in  the  previous  year) •  Investments  were  concen-
trated  on  modernization  and  structural  changes  rather  than  on 
expansion. 
These  trends are  likely to be  even  more  marked with the 
opening  up  of  the  Spanish  market  to  new  foreign  banks,  as  laid 
down  in  a  decree  last  June.  There  had until  th9n  been only four 
foreign banks  operating in Spain,  and  they were  there  largely for 
historical  reasons.  The  decree  of  last  June  does  not  allow 
complete  free  access  for  foreign  banks.  Two  important  restric-
tions  are  imposed.  First,  the  total  business  transacted  in 
pesetas  may  not  exceed  40%  of  the  total  assets held  in  Spain  (the 
aim  being  to discourage  foreign  banks  from  competing  too  strongly 
for  deposits  with  Spanish  banks).  Second,  foreign  banks  may  set 
up  only  a  limited  number  of  branches  and  agencies.  At  the  end  of 
1978  some  twenty  foreign  banks  applied  for  authorization  to  set 
up  branches  in  Spain.  This  number  included  nine  American,  two 
British,  three  French  and  three  German  banks.  A  number  of these 
applications have  been granted. - 38  -
At  least  in  the beginning,  the  government  will  probably 
try to  limit  the  number  of authorizations  it gives.  However,  the 
location  of  new  foreign  banks  in  Spain  should  be  an  important 
factor  in  the  transformation  and  modernization  of  Spanish 
banking. 
The  National  Institute for  Industry  (INI) 
In  spite of  the  delay  in  the  adoption of the  industrial 
restructing  plan  estab!ished  in  the  Moncloa  Pact,  the  government 
approved  in January  1979  an  important  investment  plan drawn  up  by 
the  INI.  This  body  is  thus  becoming  the  major  instrument  of 
Spanish  industrial policy. 
The  investment  plan  concerns  1979  and  the  amount 
involved  is  35%  higher  than  that  allowed  for  1978,  with  a  figure 
of  187  thousand million pesetas.  It aims  to  do  three  things  : 
stimulate  economic  activity and  offset  the  low  level  of private 
investment; 
- restructure  ailing  industries  (particularly  shipbuilding  and 
iron  and  steel)  and  renew  other  key  industries,  such  as  the 
automobile  and  energy  sectors  (the  energy  sector alone  takes  up 
more  than  50%  of  INI  investments); - 39  -
- assist  in  the  regional  development  policy:  thus,  investment  in 
Andalusia,  Aragon  and  the  Canaries  will  be  increased  by  more 
than  35%,  while  Galicia  is  to  get  only  3.4%  of  the  investment 
allocations. 
One  of  the  other  priorities  for  INI  action  is  a 
programme  to  develop  the  agriculture  processing  and  food  indus-
tries,  based  on  developlng  agricultural  production  in  the  less 
developed  regions.  A  large  proportion  of  the  investments  will 
also  be  allocated  to  advanced  technology  industries,  such  as 
aircraft,  electronics,  data  processing  and  defence  equipment. 
Finally,  3.5  thousand  million  pesetas  will  be  allocated  to 
research  and  development  in  the  automobile,  aluminium,  iron  and 
steel  and oil industries. 
The  INI  programmes  thus  give  an  idea of the guidelines 
of  the  Spanish  government's  industrial  policy  and  the  role  to  be 
played  by  the  public  sector.  Nationalization  is  not  currently 
regarded  in  Spain  as  an  effective  economic  or  industrial  policy 
method.  The  INI  is,  however,  taking  an  increasing  interest  in 
businesses which  are not  in difficulty. 
The  role of foreign  investments  in Spanish  industry 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  period  of expansion  in  the 
1960's,  foreign  investment,  attracted  by  a  market  of  36  million 
protected  from  external  competition,  has  played an essential part 
in  the  development  and  the  diversification  of  Spanish  industry. 
With  the  present  stagnation  of  domestic  investment  in  Spain 
itself,  foreign  companies'are  making  a  vital contribution to  the 
country's  industrial  development.  According  to  the  Ministry  of - 40  -
Commerce,  direct  foreign  investment  represented  20%  of  total 
investment  in  1978  and  amounted  to  almost  a  thousand  million 
dollars.  In  the  first eight months  of  1978,  its net contribution 
(after  deducting  Spanish  investments  abroad)  was  360  million 
dollars.  Last  year,  ten  large  multinational  companies  alone 
(including  IBM,  MONSANTO,  GRUNDIG,  NESTLE,  RENAULT,  BOSCH)  in-
vested  225  million dollars  in Spain  (*). 
Foreign  capital  has  thos  continued  to  penetrate  the 
Spanish  economy.  According  to  a  recent  survey,  foreign  capital 
is  invested  in  200  of  the  500  largest  Spanish  companies,  which 
make  90%  of  the  country's  investments;  and  in 120  of these,  over 
SO%  of the  capital is held by  foreigners. 
Foreign participation is particularly strong  in certain 
industries:  it accounts  for almost  30%  of  investment  in chemicals 
and  mining,  30%  in  engineering  and  19%  in  commerce  and  tourism. 
90%  of  plastics  production,  70%  of  paint  and  60%  of  detergent 
production is controlled by  companies  with  foreign  shareholders. 
Over  the  last  few  years,  the  government  has  encouraged 
such  foreign  contributions  by  protecting  the  domestic  market  to 
the  advantage  of  firms  located on  the  spot.  In  some  cases,  it has 
used  this  system  to  improve  the  country's  trade  balance  (for 
example,  the  export  guarantees  required  from  Ford  for  the 
manufacture  of  the  Fiesta  in  Valencia).  The  government  is  now 
actively campaigning  to attract new  investments. 
(*)  Figures given by  the  Office for  the  promotion of Spanish 
investments. - 41  -
In  addition to  the  urgent  need  to create  more  jobs,  the 
main  reason  for  this  call  for  foreign  capital  was  and  is Spanish 
industry's  own  lack  of  technology,  resulting  from  its inadequate 
expenditure  on  research and  development. 
Spain's  entry  into  the  Common  Market  will  deprive  the 
Spanish  government  of  some  of  the  means  it has  used  up  till  now 
to  attract  foreign  investment  (protection  of  the  market,  in 
particular).  The  system  of  prior  authorization,  which  is  now 
applied  only  to  majority  investments,  would  have  to  be  abolished 
for  the  EEC  countries.  It  does  not  seem  to  have  been  applied 
very  rigourously  in  any  case  (96%  of  the  applications  have  been 
accepted  over  the  last  5  years),  although  some  investors  have 
deplored  the  red  tape  involved.  The  restrictions  on  the  transfer 
of  royalties  and  the  government's  intervention  in  licensing con-
tracts would  also have  to  be  abolished. 
The  government  is  therefore  attempting  to  redefine  its 
attitude  to  foreign  investment.  But  so  far  this  is  merely  an 
intention,  and  it is still,  as  in  the past,  actively encouraging 
such  investment.  The  real  policy  is  still  to  be  defined, 
particularly with  regard  to countries outside Europe,  with  a  view 
to  Spain's EEC  membership.  The  guidelines  of this policy will  be 
significant  for  the  enlarged  Community  as  well  as  for  Spain 
itself. - 42  -
In  the  period  prior  to  Spain's  EEC  membership,  there 
should  be  consultations  with  the  Community  on  all  the  measures 
taken  by  the  Spanish  government  with  regard  to  foreign  invest-
ment.  As  soon  as  Spain  becomes  an  EEC  member,  the  Community 
rules  must  be  applied  to  Spain,  taking  into  account  the  country's 
development  needs. 
The  iron and steel  industry 
This  sector  now  has  some  important  problems,  par-
ticularly  with  regard  to  employment.  The  capacity-increase  tar-
gets  do  not  tie  in fully with  the  Community's  policy for  iron  and 
steel.  A  more  detailed  analysis  has  thus  been  made  of  this 
sector  (See  Appendix  IV). 
Conclusions  on  the  development  of Spanish  industry 
The  above  comments  show  that  the  situation  varies 
between  industries and  from  one  company  to  the  next.  Some  general 
trends  can  be  discerned,  however 
The  small- and  medium-sized  companies  are  likely  to  be  the 
worst  hit  when  the  frontiers  are  opened  up,  because  their 
financial  structure is fragile  and  they  have  been  accustomed  to 
a  protected  market  for  the  last  few  decades.  They  would  find 
themselves  in  even  greater  difficulty  if  this  protective 
structure were  stripped away  at  a  time  of recession. - 43  -
Several  large  companies  will  also  be  in  a  dificult  position, 
because  in  the  last  few  years  they  have  overestimated  the rate 
of  expansion  of  their  national  and  international  markets.  (A 
case  in  point  is  the  paper  industry,  where  the  largest 
manufacturer  was  recently  forced  to  suspend  payments  following 
an  overly  ambitious  investment  programme). 
Many  companies  have  tried  to  offset  the  drop  in  domestic 
demand  by  stepping  up  their exports.  In  many  cases,  they 
have  received  government  aid.  The  last  devaluation  of  the 
peseta  was  partly  aimed  at  expanding  the  export  markets  ( *). 
The  textile  industry  is  a  good  example:  since  1975,  it  has 
almost  doubled  the  value  of its  exports,  thereby  compensating 
in part for  the  drop  in domestic  demand. 
In  the  automobile  industry,  particularly heavy vehicles,  export 
sales  increased  by  21%  (number  of  vehicles  sold)  in  1978.  In 
the  cement  industry,  too,  a  marked  drop  in activity was  avoided 
thanks  to  the  export  trade. 
The  construction  industry,  on  the  other  hand,  has  to  rely  on 
the  domestic  market  and  this  was  one  of  the  worst  hit  by  the 
recession.  The  unemployment  rate  here  is  almost  20%.  The 
government  plans  to  increase  public  expenditure  this  year  (by 
6%  in real  terms)  to  remedy  the  situation. 
(*)  The  current  revaluation of the peseta on  the  other  h~~d, 
has been  strongly criticized by  Spanish exporters. - 44  -
According  to  the  latest  statistics  (end  of  1978), 
exports  are  still  growing.  However,  the  competitive  advantage 
gained  from  the  two  most  recent  devaluations  of  the  peseta  has 
now  almost  completely  disappeared.  Some  analyses  show  that 
Spanish  industry  stands  to  become  less  competitive  (12%  less  in 
1978,  according  to  a  Ministry  of  Commerce  study),  and  this could 
affect future  exports. 
Since  no  accurate  government  statistics  are  available, 
it  is  difficult  to  assess  which  industries  would  be  the  most 
affected by  the  removal  of protection.  There  will  certainly have 
to  be  a  number  of far-reaching  and  sometimes  difficult changes  in 
nearly all  fields  of activity. 
The  position of  the  Community  trade  organizat:ons 
Nearly  all  the  Community  trade  organizations  the 
Union  of  Industries  of  the  European  Community  (UNICE),  its  na-
tional  members  (the  Confederation  of  British  Industry,  the  Bel-
gian  Federation  des  Entreprises,  VNO,  CNPF,  etc.)  and  its  asso-
ciates  (European  federations  of  industrial  sectors)  - have  made 
formal  statements  on  Spain's application for  membership. 
They  have  all  come  out  in  favour  of  Spain's  appli-
cation,  although with  slight differences  in  the  various countries 
and  industries.  But  they  have  all  attached  conditions  to  their 
endorsement,  not  so  as  to  make  Spain's  membership  of  the  EEC  more 
difficult but  to  ensure  that  it is a  success. - 45  -
An  overriding  concern  is  apparent  from  their  state-
ments  :  enlargement  of  the  Community  must  not  slow  down  the 
construction  of  Europe  or  weaken  certain  aspects  of  the  Com-
munity.  They  have  therefore  made  it  clear  that  Spain  must 
undertake  to  implement  the  internal  and  external  aspects  of 
Community  legislation,  and  must  keep  its word. 
But  it  has  also  been  emphatically  stressed  that  the 
present  legal  and  administrative  framework  for  economic  relations 
between  the  Community  and  Spain  is  very  unsatisfactory.  Most  of 
the  trade  organizations  have  vigorously  denounced  the  broad 
imbalance  in  the  concessions  agreed  by  the  two  sides  in  the 
negotiations  for  the  1970  Agreement.  The  trade  organizations 
know  that  Spain's  real  entry  into  the  Community  (i.e.  the  point 
which  marks  the  end  of the  transitional period(s)  will  not  become 
effective  for  a  number  of  years  and  have  therefore  called  for 
immediate  adjustments. 
On  21  September  1978,  the  European  Trade  Union  Con-
federation  published  a  statement  in  favour  of Spain,  and  the  two 
other  applicants,  becoming  a  member  of  the  EEC.  It  stated  that 
the  problems  arising  from  enlargement  of  the  Community  could  be 
overcome  thanks  to  a  common  attitude  and  solidarity  on  the  part 
of  the  workers  who  were  directly concerned. 
The  French  CGT  on  the  other  hand  has  expressed  doubts 
over  the  desirability  of  Community  enlargement.  It feels  that 
Spanish membership  of the  EEC  would not  be  in  the  interest  of  the 
workers  either  of  Spain  or  of  the  Community.  It  believes  that 
Community  enlargement  cannot  fundamentally  change  the  process  of 
European  economic  integration,  which  is  dominated  by  the  monopo-
lies. - 46  -
III.  AGRICULTURE 
Special  features of Spanish agriculture 
Agriculture  is  an  important  sector  of  the  Spanish 
economy.  It  accounts  for  8. 9%  of  GDP,  i.e.  double  the  average 
figure  for  the  Community,  and  the  agricultural  workforce  repre-
sents  20%  of  the  total  working  population  in  Spain  (8.7%  in  the 
EEC).  Of  these,  1.7%  are  independent  farmers  who  employ  hired 
labour,  67.5%  work  on  family  farms  and  36.6%  are  farmworkers. 
It  is  difficult  to  forecast  how  quickly  these  figures 
will  be  reduced,  but it should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  utilized 
agricultural  area  (UAA)  of  Spain  amounts  to  22.5  million  hec-
tares,  i.e.  one  third  of  'Lhe  UAA  of  the  whole  Community  and 
slightly more  than  the  UAA  of France. 
The  considerable  potentiality  of  such  a  vast  area  is 
nevertheless  reduced  by  the  frequently  mediocre  quality  of  the 
land,  by  altitude,  relief  and  extremes  of  cli~ate  - and  this 
despite  the  major  expansion  of  irrigation  that  has  occurred 
(irrigated  land  now  amounts  to  approximately  2. 6  million  hec-
tares,  and  has  been  expanding  at  a  rate  of  60,000  hectares  per 
year). 
Agricultural  technology  is still  frequently  behindhand 
and  yields  of  "major  crops"  lag  well  behind  those  of  the  EEC; 
wheat  15.5  quintals  (EEC  37.2);  barley  18.1  quintals  (EEC  36.5); 
maize  37.3  quintals  (EEC  48);  potatoes  141  quintals  {EEC  240); 
beet  321  quintals  {EEC  399). - 47  -
The  situation is quite  different  when  it comes  to  fresh 
fruits,  citrus fruits,  vegetables,  wine  and  olive oil  and  even  if 
aridity  remains  a  negative  factor,  the  climate  favours  early 
yields  so  that fresh  fruits  and  vegetables arrive  on  the  European 
market  earlier  in  the  season.  These  very  competitive  products 
form  a  total  of  34.8%  of  the  final  production  of  Spanish 
agriclture  (whereas  the  same  products  only  account  for  16.9%  of 
the  Community's  total  agricultural  production).  They  also  make  up 
74%  of Spain's agricultural  exports  (60%  of which  go  to  the  EEC). 
Reactions  from  the  farming  community  in  the  EEC 
Those  most  concerned  about  Spain's  entry  into  the  EEC 
are  obviously  farmers  from  the  Mediterranean  regions  of  the 
Community.  They  are  the  first  who  will  have  to  withstand 
competition  from  Spain  and  the  markets  of  some  of  them  will  be 
penetrated directly by  Spanish products.  Their  reaction are  the 
reactions  of  regions  to  a  nation.  It  is  not  without  signifi-
cance  for  these  r-iedi terranean  farmers  that  agricultural policy is 
decided  in  Brussels  (i.e.  in  a  place far  removed  from  the  centre 
of  their  future  problems)  whereas  for  Spanish  farmers  Madrid  is 
the  arbitrator  of  their  problems.  Horeover,  Madrid  has  been 
preparing  to  enter  the  Common  Market  for  15  years,  where  it can 
hardly  be  said  that  Brussels  has  studied  the  implications  of 
Spain's membership  with  the  same  passion. - 48  -
A  number  of Committee  Studies  and  Opinions  have  already 
dealt  with  the  particular!  ties  of  the  Community's  Mediterranean 
regions,  the  weakness  of  their  economies,  the  characteristic 
nature  of  their  agricultural  products  and  the  competition  they 
face  from  the  whole  Mediterranean  basin  - competition  which  is 
aggravated  by  various  Community  agreements  (*). 
It  would  be  helpful  to  draw  attention  here  to  two 
aspects  highlighted  by  the  Annual  Report  on  the  Agricultural 
Situation  for  1978  (maps,  page  46  to  50),  namely  the  small  size 
of  holdings  and  the  ageing  farm  populat::..ons  in  the  Community's 
Mediterranean  regions.  Both  factors  clearly  militate  against 
rapid  adjustment  to  new  situations. 
Hitherto,  farmers  from  these  regions,  disappointed  by 
the  lack of guarantees  offered by  the  market  regulations  covering 
thelr  products  and  conscious  of  the  fact  that  this  is  reflected 
in  the  very  small  sums  of  money  made  available  under  the 
Guarantee  Section  of  the  EAGGF,  have  been  under  the  impression 
that  ~hey have  been  chosen  in  advance  as  the  sacrificial  lambs  of 
enlargement  - and  this,  despite  the  recent  (though  belated  and 
inadequate)  measures  to  help  Mediterranean  agriculture.  These 
Mediterranean  farmers  consider  that  a  long  transitional  period 
will  be  the  answer  to  their problems  since it will  give  them  time 
to  make  the  necessary adjustments. 
Farmers  from  other  EEC  regions,  however,  are  hoping  to 
supply  Spain with  the  cereals  and  animal  products  she still needs 
to  import,  so  a  long transitional period would  probably not  be  to 
their advantage. 
(*)  See,  inter  alia,  ESC  Study  on  the  present  prospects  of  the 
Community's  Mediterranean  agricultural  products,  27  November 
1975,  in particular pages  20  to  26. - 49  -
Potential of  Spa~ish agriculture 
The  main  fears  of  European  farmers  centre  on  the 
productive  capacity  of  Spanish  agriculture.  This  capac!  ty  is 
based  on  an  agricultural  area  which  is  far  greater  than  that  of 
France  and  Italy  and  on  social  and  economic  factors  which  are 
particularly important  in the present European  recession. 
Farmers  emphasize  that  Spain  has  land which  has  not  yet 
been  fully  exploited  and  can  easily  be  converted,  the  still 
relatively  low yields  and  the  large-scale  introd~ction of irriga-
tion,  consolidation  of  holdings  and  modern  cultivation  and 
administrative  methods.  It  is  inevitable  that  - as  the  ex-
perience  of  the  last  few  years  and  the  dynamic  Spanish  agricul-
tural  policy  have  shown  - this  situation will generate  increases 
in  yields  and  the  volume  of  production,  perhaps  faster  than 
anticipated.  Spanish productivity is now  higher  than  the  Commu-
nity's as  regards  some  citrus and  other fruit crops  {*). 
The  degree  of  self-sufficiency  is  likely  to  be  even 
greater  with  the  introduction  of  Community  legislation  into 
Spain.  Olive  oil,  for  example,  which  is  at  present  protected 
from  imports  from  other  countries,  will  face  strong  competition 
from  the  free  importation  of  cheap  oil-seeds  and  animal  and 
vegetable  fats;  which  will  add  considerably  to  the  existing 
surpluses  of olive oil. 
{*)  Some  experts  do,  however,  challenge  the  forecasts  made 
in this paragraph. - 50  -
Spanish  farmers  - insofar  as  one  can get  to  know  their 
views  - remain  moderate  and  pragmatic.  They  know  that  their 
future  lies  in  the  Community  but  perhaps  do  not  realize  how  many 
adjustments  they  themselves  are going  to  have  to make. 
The  aims  of the  Common  Agricultural Policy 
The  CAP  can  be  broken  down  into  three  main  areas;  a 
single market,  Community preference  and  financial  solidarity. 
The  single  market 
The  single  market  is  first  and  foremost  the  free 
movement  of agricultural  products  - hence  competition.  We  often 
hear  in  this  respect  that  Spanish  farm  products  are  potentially 
price-competitive  because  of  lower  costs,  particularly  wages  and 
social  insurance  charges.  These  components  of  production  costs 
weigh  particularly  heavily  in  the  case  of  fruits,  wine  and 
vegetables  (*). 
One  can  assume  that  economic  progress  will  be  main-
tained  in  Spain  and  wages  will  thus  continue  to  rise.  Never-
theless,  such  economic  progress  should  be  spread  evenly all over 
Spain,  otherwise  areas  of  under-development  will  persist  and  it 
may  take  a  long  time  to  coften  the  abnormal  competitive  edge 
derived  therefrom. 
Social  security  contributions  will  remain  well  below 
those  in  Community  agriculture,  unless  a  determined  effort  is 
made  to close  the  gap. 
(*)  At  the present  time,  however,  agricultural  wages  appear 
to  be  increasing at  a  quite  considerable  rate. - 51  -
The  volume  of  production,  and  times  of  harvesting, 
could  prove  to  be  even  more  dangerous  from  the  point  of  view  of 
competition. 
The  sheer  abundance  of  agricultural  goods  from  Spain 
could  depress  the  Community  market  of  fruit  and  vegetables, 
particularly  since  the  imports  will  arrive  before  many  Community 
products  are  ready  for  the  market.  As  a  result  of  the  abolition 
of  seasonal  trade  restrictions,  imports  from  Spain  could  have  a 
seriouG  effect  on  the  Community's  early  vegetable  and  fruit 
growers  before  affecting  the  bulk  of Community  production. 
As  far  as  agriculture  is  concerned,  a  single  market 
implies  organization,  and  although  Spain  would  appear  to  have  the 
resources  to  participate  in  the  common  organization  of  ag-
ricultural  markets,  it has  to  be  recognized  that  at  present  some 
products  (the  same  in  both  Spain  and  the  Community)  have  a 
well-organized  market  whilst  some  (also  the  same  in  both camps) 
do  not  enjoy  the  same  guarantees.  In  other words  the  situation 
will  not  be  improved  solely  by  enlargement,  but  by  resolute 
Community  action.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  common 
organization  of  markets  can  ensure  the  effective  coordination of 
"juxtaposed"  regional  markets  resulting  from  current  regulations 
while  simultaneously  safeguarding  the  principle of free  movement. 
In  any  event,  however,  a  long  transitional  period  might  be 
desirable  from  the point  of view  of competition. 
Community  preference 
Community  preference  in  an  enlarged  narket  is  quite 
different  from  what  it was  in  the  original  Community  of Six.  It 
already  amounts  to  free  trade  in  the  case  of  certain  products, 
especially  if  one  also  takes  into  consideration  the  effect  of 
trade  preferences  granted  to  a  large  number  of  Mediterranean 
countries. - 52  -
But  if  Community  preference  in  fact  means  strong  com-
petition,  it  is  also  the  sole  chance  European  farmers  have  of 
exporting  their  agricultural  products  to  Spain  in  fact  only 
11.2%  of  Spain's  imports  of  agricultural  goods  come  from  the  EEC 
whilst  59.8% of Spain's agricultural  exports  go  to  the  Community. 
From  this  point  of  view  a  short transitional  period  would  be 
preferable  in  order  to  discourage  Spain  from  developing  certain 
products  which  are  currently  in  short  supply  and  which  would  be 
much  more  so  in  the  event  of an  economic  recovery  that  generated 
more  consumption  (*)  particularly  of  highprotein  foods.  An 
increase  in  consumption  in  Spain  could  help  tc.  reduce  certain 
current  surpluses  in  the  EEC. 
In  a  similar  way,  encouraging  Spanish  agriculture  to 
concentrate  on  certain  products  lacking  in  ~he  EEC  (protein 
foods, 
munity. 
textiles  ••. )  would  be  beneficial  to  the  enlarged  Com-
However,  the  pattern  of  production  in  an  enlarged 
Community  cannot  be  determined  either  unilaterally  or  in  a 
single direction.  With  Mediterranean  countries  joining the  EEC, 
the  Community  must  seize  the  opportunity  to  define  its production 
goals  as  the  Committee  has  been  requesting ever 
since  1975. 
Financial  solidarity 
In  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  financial  solidarity 
is  the  precondition  for  (a)  the  organization  of  common  markets, 
and  (b)  price  support.  As  far  as  the  improvemen~ of structures 
is  concerned,  however,  its  role  is  confined  to  that of acting as 
a  stimulus. 
(*)  Annual  per capita consumption  in  the  EEC  and  Spain  : 
meat,  81.9  kg  and  60.1  kg  respectively;  cheese  10.9  kg  and 
3.4  kg  respectively;  .sugar  38  kg  and  27  kg  respectively. 
Spain's degree  of self-sufficiency in maize  is 36.5%. - 53  -
Spain  1 s  entry  into  the  Community  will  have  a  major 
impact  on  the  EAGGF  budget  for  three  reasons  : 
- Spain  is a  large agricultural  country;  its presence  in  the  EEC 
will  automatically  mean  that more  products will  be  eligible for 
price guarantees  and  it can  be  assumed  that  Spain will  be  a  net 
recipient of  ~Jnds from  the  Community  budget. 
In  view  of  the  irnpo:rtan~e  of  fruit,  vegetable  and  wine  pro-
duction  in  Spain,  it is  hard  to  imagi.ne  that  she will  agree  to 
enter  the  Community  without  bigger  price  guarantees  for  these 
products  - guarantees  that  are  in  any  case  demanded  by all  the 
existing Mediterranean  regions  of the  EEC. 
- Structural  ch&lges  in Spain will  be  on  a  large scale,  what  with 
(a)  the  consolidation  of  holdings  and  allied  operations  (b) 
irrigation  and  (c)  development  products.  Nor  should  it  be 
forgotten  that  half  of  Spain  1 s  farming  land  is  in  hill  and 
mountain  regions.  It is  therefore  essential  that  EAGGFGuidance 
funds  are  unfrozen. 
Farmers  do  not  want  to  be  blamed  for  the  higher 
cost  ( *)  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  in  an  enlarged  Com-
munity.  They  point  out  that  it is unacceptable,  that  agricul-
tural  producers  alone,  especially  those  in  the  less  favoured 
areas,  should suffer the full  consequences  - in  terms  of  income 
{*)  The  figure  according  to  Commission  estimates,  being  600 
million  EUA  for  the  EAGGF-Guarantee  Section  and  200-250 
million EUA  for  the  EAGGF  Guidance  Section. - 54  -
and  emp:ioyment  - of  the  Community's  external  policies  on  en-
largement  and  the  developing countries.  They  therefore call for 
detailed analyses  of the  effects of  these  policies on  the  economy 
and  the  employment  situation.  Some  farmers  have  also called for 
an  Accession  Fund  to  be  set  up  and  for  a  regional  policy  to 
accompany  enlargement,  designed  to  remedy  regional  disparities 
and  to bring capital  to where  there  is a  ready  labour force. 
The  Fishing Industry 
An  impasse  has  been  reached  in  the  Community  fishing 
policy  because  of  the  lack  of  agreement  among  the  Nine  on  the 
application  of  a  common  system  for  managing fish  resources.  But 
the  Community  now  seems  to  be  tending  towards  a  system  based  on 
the  annual  fixing  of  quotas  for  sea  fishing  which  will  be 
allocatee  to  the  countries  concerned  in  accordance  with  their 
past catches. 
Spain's  membership  in  the  Community  will  raise  the 
difficult  problem  of  capacity.  Community  capacity  already  far 
exceeds  :he  catch  possibilities,  and  the  situation  will  become 
even  worse  with  the  accession of  Spain,  which  largely  depends  for 
its  production  on  the  present  Community's  fishlng  areas.  The 
Spanish  fleet  is.  in  fact,  the  third largest  in  the  world,  after 
those  of  ~he USSR  and  Japan 
Number  ~  (gross  registered  tons) 
EEC  2,380  794,350 
Spain  1,797  580,000 
Portugal  165  126,500 
Greece  100  43,600 - 55  -
There  are  70,000  fishermen  in  Spain,  as  compared  with 
47,000  in  Greece,  30,000  in  Portugal  and  some  150,000  in  the 
Con~~~unity. 
At  present,  the  European  ColliTiuni ty  regards  Spain  as  a 
non-Member  State  under  its  fishing  laws  and  restricts  the  access 
of  Spanish  fishP.rmen  to  its  fishing  areas.  The  latter,  who  are 
largely  Basques,  are  traditionally obliged  (because  of the  small 
size  of  their boats)  to  fish  in Community waters.  The  receipts 
from  fishing  are  a  very  important  source  of  revenue  for  the 
economy  of  the  region  in  question.  The  Basque  fishermen  are 
surprised  by  what  they  regard  as  the  restrictive attitude of the 
authorities  in  Brussels  to  a  region  which  is to  become  a  part of 
the  Community. 
The  Spanish  trade  organizations  are  therefore  calling 
for  a  large  increase  in  their  quotas,  with  a  view  to  Spanish 
membership  in  the  EEC.  In  any  event,  EEC  membership  will 
benefit  Spanish  fishermen,  since  the  allocation of  quotas  is  to 
be  based  on  past catches. 
Spain  must  henceforth  cooperate  with  the  Community  in 
order  to  bring  about  the  desired  restructuring  of  the  fishing 
industry,  taking  into  account  the  development  of capacity in the 
light  of probable  changes  in  the  available  resources  (quotas  for 
fishing).  This  restructuring  should  pave  the  way  for  fishermen 
to  regulate  their own  catches,  taking  into  account  the  market  and 
fish  stocks,  so  as  to  permit  the  effective  management  of 
resources. - 56  -
IV.  IMMEDIATE  ISSUES  OF  COMMUNITY  RELATIONS  WITH  SPAIN 
The  1970 Agreement  between  the  EEC  and  Spain 
The  Initial Agreement 
The  preferential  trade  agreement  between  Spain  and  the 
EEC  came  into effect  on  1  October  1970. 
The  Agreement  was  to  be  in  two  phases,  but  only  the 
content of  the  first phase,  which  was  to  last at  least six years, 
has  been  worked  out  in  detail.  The  Agreement  conformed with  the 
GATT  provisions  concerning  possible  exceptions  to  the 
most-favoured-nation  clause  and  laid  the  foundations  for  a 
free-trade  area  since  it  states  (in  its  Article  1)  that  "the 
progressive  elimination  of  obstacles  to  the  main  body  of  trade 
...  shall  be  brought  about  ..•  ". 
Tariff Reductions 
a)  Under  the  Agreement  the  EEC  dismantled  its  tariffs  in  the 
following  stages  : 
- 30%  reduction  in  the  Common  Customs  Tariff upon  implementation 
of the  Agreement; 
- 50%  from  1  January  1972; - 57  -
- 60%  from  1  January  1973; 
these  reductions applied  to  almost  all  industrial products 
and  a  number  of agricultural products. 
b)  Spain  was  to  dismantle  its  tariffs  over  a  longer  period  of 
time  (in  six  stages)  and  the  reductions  only  applied  to  a 
limited number  of products 
- the  60%  reduction,  which  came  into  effect  from  1  January 1977, 
only  applied  to  non-sensitive  products  (see  List A in Annex  II 
to  the Agreement); 
- the  25%  reduction,  which  also  came  into  effect  from  1  January 
1977,  covered  the majority of products  (see Lists B  and C). 
There  is thus  an  imbalance  - to  the  disadvantage  of the 
Community  in  the  application  of  tariff  reductions,  this 
imbalance  being  heightened  by  the  differences  in  the  duties  to 
which  the  reductions  applied  (the  EEC  average  tariff  on  indus-
trial goods  imported  from  Spain being  5%  - 7%,  tne  average  tariff 
applied by  Spair.,to Community  industrial  goods  being 25%- 30%). 
Quotas 
Comparable  arrangements  were  reached  in  respect  of 
quotas.  Spanish exports  could  enter the  EEC  without quantitative 
restrictions but Spain continues  to  apply  quotas  to many  imports 
from  the  EEC. - 58  -
Under  the  Agreement,  Spain  was  to  make  an  annual 
increase  of  13%  in  its  quotas  for  a  considerable  number  of 
products  (see  List  D  in Annex  II);  this was  an  average  figure  and 
~it  was  specified  that  each  individual  quota  was  to  be  increased 
by  at  least  7%.  The  impact  of  this  arrangement  has  been  eroded 
by  inflation  and  the  devaluation  of  the  Spanish currency,  as  the 
quotas  are  expressed  in  terms  of pesetas. 
Under  Article  6  of  Annex  II,  Spain  committed  itself to 
reduce  quantitative  restrictions  (after  the  sixth  year of appli-
cation  of  the  Agreement)  to  5%  in  value  of  the  average  total 
imports  from  the  Community  in 1966,  1967  and  1968. 
With  regard  to  farm  produce,  the  Community  granted 
tariff  concessions  for  citrus  fruits,  certain  types  of  fresh 
fruit  and  vegetables,  olive  oil  and  certain fish.  Quota  conces-
sions  for  certain  types  of  wine  (sherry,  Malaga,  Jumilla, 
Priorato,  Rioja,  Valdepenas)  have  also  been  granted  by  the 
Community. 
In  turn,  Spain  pledged  to  purchase  at least  30%  of ita 
butter  imports  on  the  Community  market  from  1  January  1976. - 59  -
Safeguard Clause 
The  Agreement  authorizes  the  EEC  and  Spain  to  take 
anti-dumping  and  other  safeguard  measures  in  respect  of  their 
trade  with  each  other.  This  clause  has  scarcely  been  used  over 
the  seven  year  period,  despite  the  fact  that  some  sectors in the 
Community  have  been put  in serious difficulty. 
Extension of the Agreement 
The  EEC  and  Spain had  an  exchange  of  l~tters on  25  July 
1977  which  led  to  the  Agreement  being extended  to cover  the  three 
countries  which  had  joined  the  Community  on  1  January  1973.  It 
had  been  envisaged  that  fundamental  adjustments  to  the  1970 
Agreement  could be  made  at  the  same  time. 
What  took  place  was  merely  a  series  of  legal  and 
technical  adjustments  to  the  Agreement.  The  two  parties  to  the 
Agreement  informed  each  other  of  the  decisions  which  they  had 
taken  independently  to  extend  th  scope  of  the  Agreement  to 
include  tariffs  and  quotas  for  trade  with  the  three  new  Member 
States.  The  tariffs  on  trade  between  Spain  and  the  three  new 
Member  States  were  aligned  on  the  tariffs  laid  down  by  the  1970 
Agreement.  The  quotas  were  increased  to  take  into  account  the 
enlargement  of  the  EEC.  (But  the  methods  used  by  Spain  to 
calculate  these  increases differed  from  those  used  by  the EEC). - 60  -
Adjustments  to  the Agreements 
On  a  number  of  occasions  the  Community  has put  forward 
proposals  for  the  second  phase  of  the Agreement  and  for progres-
sing  towards  complete  and  reciprocal  abolition  of  customs  and 
quota  barriers.  In  brief,  the  most  recent  Community  proposals, 
made  in December  1977,  are  as  follows  : 
The  Community  would  introduce  concessions  for various agricul-
tural  products  produced  by  Spain,  and  reduce  customs  duties  by 
20%  on  a  number  of  sensitive  industrial  products  on  which 
duties  had  either not  been  reduced  at all  or  reduced  by  only  a 
small  amount; 
- Spain,  for  its  part,  would  make  further  reductions  of  be~ween 
15  and  20%  in  the  duty  on  products  completely  or  par~ially 
exempted  from  the previous  tariff reductions.  Spain  would  also 
make  adjustments  to  the  method of calculating quotas. 
The  Community  also  proposed  that  there  should  be 
negotiations  on  products  covered  by  ECSC  provisions. 
These  latest  Community  proposals  were  rejected  by  the 
Spanish  Government  on  8  February  1978.  Spain  wanted  bigger  EEC 
concessions  on  agriculture:  it  wan ted  to  maintain  its  share  of 
the  Irish,  Danish  and  UK  markets  and  it  wanted  concessions 
comparable  to  those  granted  to  the  Maghreb  count~ies.  In  respect 
of  industrial  products,  Spain  declared  its  readiness  to  grant 
tariff  concessions  of  comparable  scope  to  those  proposed  by  the 
Community. - 61  -
Spain  proposed  mutual  dismantling  of  tariffs  on  pro-
ducts  covered  by  the  ECSC  provisions. 
The  Practical Problems 
A  close  look  at  trade  flows  between  the  EEC  and  Spain 
since  1970  shows  that,  the percentage of Spanish  imports  from  the 
Community  covered  by  exports  in  the  reverse  direction  has 
increased  steadily  (1972  59%,  1974  :  60%,  1976  :  70%,  1977  : 
78%,  1978  :  93%). 
A  closer  sectoral  and  regional  examination  shows  that 
real  difficulties  are  being  encountered  by  the  Comm•.mi ty.  These 
difficulties  can  be  put  down  to  the  terms  of the  1970  Agreement, 
to  unilateral  measures  taken  by  Spain  and  to  a  number  of  laws, 
administrative provisions  and  other measures  in  force  in Spain. 
In  recent  years,  many  Community  businessmen  have  been 
faced  by  measures  which  have  impeded  their sales  in  Spain.  Three 
examples  may  be  cited  : 
The  blanket,  unilateral  ra1s1ng  of  customs  duties  on  30  August 
1976  by  6%,  12%  or  20%  (depending  on  the  product  concerned; 
this  was  a  temporary  measure,  for  a  period  of  six  months,  and 
it was  terminated on  28  February  1977; 
- the  introduction  on  8  October  1976  of  a  general  import 
surcharge  of  20%  over  and  above  the  aforementioned  increased 
duties;  this  surcharge  remained  in  force  until  8  October 1977; - 62  -
the  reintroduction  of  a  1939  Law  under  which  it is possible  to 
prevent  companies  receiving  public  assistance  (particularly 
financial  aid)  from  importing capital  goods  in  competition with 
goods  which  are,  or might  be  produced  in  Spain. 
The  devaluations  of  the  peseta  increased  the  price  of 
imported  products  and  provided  a  stimulus  for  Spanish  exports. 
The  two  most  recent  devaluations  of the  peseta against  the  dollar 
were  of  10%  on  9  February  1976  and  20%  on  12  July  1977.  In  the 
meantime,  however,  the  value  of the peseta has  increased by  about 
15%  against  the  dollar  (April  1978). 
The  import  duty  to  offset  internal  taxes  on  home-
produced  products  (ICGI)  is  designed  to  ensure  that  imported  and 
home-produced  goods  are  treated  alike  for  tax  purposes.  It  is 
levied  on  imports  in  order  to  offset  the  multi-stage  taxes  on 
goods  produced  in  Spain.  But  this  duty  is  applied  at  different 
rates,  based  on  a  series  of  flat-rate  assessments  made  in  1964 
which,  with  a  few  exceptions,  have  not  been  revised  since  that 
time.  In  reality,  indirect  taxation  bears  more  heavily  on 
imports  than  Spanish  products,  thus  introducing  discrimination, 
of varying  degrees,  against  imported  products. 
This  import  duty  has  a  counterpart  under which  exports 
are  eligible  for  a  refund  of  internal  taxes.  But  the  rates  of 
such  refunds  are  likewise  based  on  standard- rate  assessments  of 
internal  taxes  (turnover  tax,  taxes  on  manufacturing  equipment, 
fuel  taxes,  local  taxes,  stamp  duty  and  other  internal  taxes). 
The  civil  service  has  not  revealed  the  exact  method  of  calcula-
tion.  The  system  seems  often to boil  down  to  a  subsidy. - 63  -
The  Spanish  taxation  system  does  not  therefore  have  the 
neutral  effect  on exports and  imports  of the  EEC  VAT  System.  For 
this  reason  it  is  important  that  the  Spanish  Government  should 
rapidly apply  the  indirect  tax  reform currently being prepared. 
There  are  a  number  of  factors  which  give  rise  to 
uncertainty  on  the  part  of  EEC  exporters.  These  factors,  whose 
effect  vary  according  to  the  different  sectors  are  the 
supe~vision of import prices,  the  way  in which  the  value  of goods 
for  customs  purposes  is  assessed,  the  introduction  of  specific 
duties,  the  way  the  customs  nomenclature  is  interpreted,  insis-
tence  on  the  need  for  approval  of  chambers  of  commerce  even  in 
cases where  this is not  an express  requirement,  and  delays  in the 
issue  of  import  licences  and  in  the  transfer  of  repayments  and 
capital.  The  Committee  observes  that  numerous  exporters  in  all 
Community  countries are  complaining  about  these  obstacles. 
It  is  apparent  from  the  latest  Council  decisions  that 
Spain will  not  join the  EEC  for at least  three years  (time  needed 
for  negotiations,  parliamentary  ratifications,  etc.).  It  seems 
improbable  that  throughout  this  period  no  progress  will  be  made 
in  contractual  alignment  of  the  legal,  economic  and  social 
conditions  governing relations between  the  Community  and  Spain. 
Spain  must  henceforth  adapt  to  the  conditions  pre-
vailing  in  the  Community,  at  least  as  regards  certain  factors 
which  have  a  determining effect on  the  pattern of trade.  If this 
preliminary  adaptation  is  not  made,  Spain  may  have  to  request 
exemptions  and  delays  when  the  transi  tiona!  period  begins  in 
order  to  take  into  account  the  difficulties  encountered  in  some 
sectors of her economy. - 64  -
This  adaptation  is  also  necessary  to  satisfy  the 
Community's  economic  interest  groups,  who  want  to  see production 
conditions  and  the  terms  of trade  between  Spain  and  the  Community 
aligned as  quickly  as possible. 
Spain  has  taken  a  first  step  towards  adaptation  by 
entering  into  negotiations  with  the  EFTA  countries  aimed  at 
according  them  the  treatment  it gives  to  the  EEC  under  the  1970 
Agreement.  The  EEC/Spain Joint Committee  which  met  on  24  J~uary 
1979  did  not  achieve  positive  results.  While  the  Spanish  recog-
nized  on  that  occasion  that  there  had  been  problems  in  implemen-
ting  the  agreement,  no  practical steps were  decided  to  solve  them 
or  to  make  further  adaptations.  It  should,  however,  be  noted 
that  Spain  announced  at  the  end  of April  that  there  would  be  a 
partial  suspension  of  import  duties  for  three  months.  As  this 
provision  is  of  general  application  it;  will  not  imply  any  new 
preference  for  EC  imports.  Spain  has  also  removed  a  number  of' 
import  quotas. 
More  specifically,  by  means  of'  mutual  consultation  and 
information,  the  Community  should  induce  Spain  to  begin  to  make  a 
selective  adaptation  to  Community  conditions.  This  should  be  a 
fundamental  element  in talks  on  Spain's membership. - 65  -
"Selective  adaptation"  means  adaptation  on  the  fol-
lowing  points  which  are  essential  for  the  norms.l  development  of 
trade 
a)  as  regards  the  commercial  aspects 
- immediate  z·eduction of Spain's "tariff peaks"; 
- expansion  and  phasing out  of import  quotas; 
cessation of abnormal  customs practices  {goods  being held up  in 
customs,  withholding  of  import  licences,  etc.); 
- abolition of aid  for exports  to  the  Community; 
b)  as  regards  indirect taxes,  abolition  of  refunds  for  exports 
and  of  import  dues  which  presupposes  the  introduction  of  VAT 
as  quickly as possible; 
c)  as  regards  industrial property,  adaptation  of  Spanish  regula-
tions  on  patents,  trade  marks  and  designs  to  ensure  that  the 
interests of Community  operators are  effectively protected. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  shares  the  view  that 
for  political  re~sons,  and  also  in  order  to  promote  the  economic 
development  of  the  Community  in  the  medium  and  long  term  and 
strengthen 1 ts international  position,  the  negotiations  for  the 
entry  of  Spain  into  the  EEC  should  be  brought  to  a  positive 
conclusion. - 66  -
However,  the  preceding  pages  have  given  some  idea  of 
the  extent  of  the  problems  which  both  Spain  and  the  Community 
have  to  face  if true  accession  is  to  be  achieved.  In  its Opinion 
of  29  November  1978  the  Commission  stated  that  Spanish  entry 
could  only  be  considered  a  success  if  it  were  accomplished 
"without  intolerable  strains  on  either  side".  The  Committee 
concurs  fully  with  this  sentioent  and  therefore  lays  special 
emphasis  on  the  comments  in  Chapter  IV  above  on  the  immediate 
issues  of Community Relations with  Spain. 
As  far  as  agriculture  is  concerned,  the  above  comments 
shed  1 ight  on  the  diversity,  scope  and  urgency  of  the  decisions 
to  be  taken.  Far-reaching  and  prolonged  action  will  be  needed 
if  Spain  is  to  join  the  Community  without  creating  serious 
problems.  This  is  why  farmers  would  like  to  see  a  transitional 
period  whose  duration  is  (a)  regula~ed  by  the  general  provisions 
to  be  laid  down  under  the  Treaty of Accession,  and  (b)  is related 
to  the  actual  commitments  (of  both  the  Community  and  Spain) 
entered  into  at  each stage. 
Without  waiting  for  the  transitional  period,  the  time 
prior to  Spain's membership  should  be  used  : 
a)  to  achieve  a  convergence  of the  economies  of the  Community  and 
Spain; 
b)  to  improve  trading  conditions  between  Spain  and  the  European 
Community  in  accordance with  the  1970 Agreement  which  provided 
for  the  phased  abolition  of  obstacles  in most  areas of trade; 
and - 67  -
c)  to  carry  out  integrated  modernization  and  redevelopment  pro-
grammes  covering  both  agriculture  and  other  economic  sectors 
of  the  Mediterranean  regions  of  the  EEC.  These  programmes 
should  make  immediate  use  of  the  whole  range  of  resources  at 
the  disposal  of the  Community,  i.e.  ERDF,  EIB,  Social  Fund  and 
the  EAGGF,  to benefit  the  Member  States. 
Market  organizations  will,  if  necessary,  have  to  be 
adjusted  in  order  to  match  changes  in  the  supply  and  demand  of 
Mediterranean  products  and  safeguard  the  incomes  of this growing 
band  of  producers.  But  administering  the  regulations  and  poli-
cies  will  be  trickier  on  account  of  the  greater  diversity  of 
situations. 
As  far  as  Spain  is  concerned,  Community  action  must 
concentrate  on  setting up  the  necessary  administrative structures 
(back-up  facilities,  management,  controls)  and  producer organiza-
tions  (cooperatives,  inter-trade  associations)  if  such  regula-
tions are  to  be  implemented satisfactorily. 
A pattern of production will  have  to  be  adopted  that is 
in  accord  with  the  interests  not  only  of  prcducers  but  also 
consumers  and  EEC  tax-payers.  This  would  mean  paying  attention 
to export  openings  and  a  job-creating policy in the Mediterranean 
regions  of  the  Community.  This  can  be  a  starting point  for  the 
control  over production which  is wanted  in Europe. - 68  -
At  the  same  time  efforts will  need  to  be  made  to  pro-
mote  the  consumption  of  Mediterranean  agricultural  products 
throughout  the  Community.  This  involves  tackling  the  question of 
quality and  a  number  of price  components  (taxation,  transport, 
distribution,  factors  of production,  etc.). 
For  activities  other  than  agriculture,  Spanish  entry 
should  not,  generally  speaking,  cause  so  many  difficult problems 
in  the  Community  provided  that  equality  as  regards  market  access 
is brought  about  effectively  and  rapidly. 
However,  it  cannot  be  ruled  out  that  difficulties  may 
arise  in  certain  sectors  or  certain  regions  of  the  EEC.  It  is 
therefore  essential  to  set  up  machinery  that  will  effectively 
prevent  them  from  occurring.  For  this  reason  the  Committee 
approves  the  Commission's  proposal  to  have  a  general  safeguard 
clause  covering  the  whole  of  the  transitional  period.  Such  a 
clause  should  include  machinery  to  monitor  imports  of  products 
considered  as  "sensitive"  so  that  it can be  implemented  promptly 
should  the  need arise. 
Moreover,  conditions  of  competition  may  be  modified at 
any  time  by  changes  in  currency  pari  ties,  at  least  for  a  short 
while.  It  is  therefore  essential  that  Spain  is  associated  as 
rapidly as possible with EEC  consultations  on  monetary  matters 
and  gradually  accepts  the  corresponding  disciplines.  Surpri-
singly,  the  Commission's  Opinion  is silent on  this point,  and  the 
Commission  should  deal  with  this problem. - 69  -
If  deadlines  have  to  be  set  to  enable  Spain  to  pro-
gressively narrow  the  gap  separating her from  the  Community,  they 
must  be  geared  as  closely  as  possible  to  real  needs  and  the 
actual  situation.  It  should  be  possible  to  lay  down  different 
deadlines  according  to  the  sectors  or  activities  concerned,  as 
the  Commission  proposes.  Here, 
not  try  to  take  over  wholesale 
too,  as  elsewhere,  one  should 
the  solutions  worked  out  for 
Greece  or  Portugal.  For  numerous  industries  in  the  Community 
the  transitional period for Spain  should  be  as  short  as possible, 
but  there  should  be  exceptions  for  certain  sectors  sensit1v~  to 
Spanish  competition  and  certain  branches  of  the  food  processing 
industry. 
The  10-year  transi  tiona!  period  proposed  in  the  Com-
mision's Opinion  should  not  therefore  apply  to all trade.  It can 
only  be  considered  as  a  maximum  which  it would  be  desirable  to 
shorten  in all  areas where  such action is possible. 
At  any  event,  and  before  formal  accession  takes  place 
Spain  should  agree  to  be  involved  in  the  implementation  of  cer-
tain  Community  policies  considered  to  be  essential.  One  could 
take  as examples  the  question of State aid and  the  implementation 
of specific policies in  individual  industries. 
More  generally,  when  conducting her own  economic  policy 
Spain  will  have  to  take  account  of  restructuring  policies 
undertaken by  the  Nine,  in order to  avoid  adding  additional - 70  -
difficulties  in  sensitive  sectors.  The  Study  shows  that  those 
industries  which  are  in  dif:f'icul  ties  in  the  Community  {ship-
buildings,  steel,  etc.)  are  also  in  trouble  in Spain,  o:f'ten  even 
more  so.  Conversely,  the  Commission  has  rightly pointed out  (1) 
that  when  framing  its  own  industrial  policy  the  Community,  :for 
its  part,  should  keep  the  prospect  of  enlargement  in  mind  and 
prepare  for  the  integration  of  the  Rpplicant  countries  in 
conjunction with  these  nations. 
The  above  remarks,  which  are  of particular relevance  to 
industrial policy,  apply  to external  relations,  where  it would  be 
desirable  for  Spain  to  take  account  right now  o:f'  the  Community's 
commitments  and  obligations,  as  she  will  have  to  honour  them 
herself.  In  ot~er  words,  when  conducting  her  own  external 
economic  and  commercial  policy  Spain  should  not  use  the  :freedom 
of  action  which  she  still  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Nine  to 
accentuate  the  di:f':f'erences  between  the  rules  :followed  by her and 
by  the  Community  in dealings with  non-EEC  countries or blocs. 
In  joining  the  Community  Spain  will  have  to  accept  the 
Community  patrimony.  This  means,  as  :far as extErnal  a:f':f'airs  are 
concerned,  that  she  will  have  to  endorse  all  the  Community's 
commitments  towards  1 ts  partners  and  especially  those  with  whom 
it  cultivates  privileged  relations  (e.g.  the  EFTA,  ACP,  Maghreb 
and  Mashreq  countries 
li~e  that  of  Greece 
Rnd  GSP  beneficiaries).  Spain's  entry, 
or  Portugal,  should  not  lead  to  the 
(1)  See  the  Commission's  Communication  to  the  Council  of 
19  April  1978  entitled "General  Consideration  on  the 
Problems  ot'  Enlargement". - 71  -
development  of  protectionist  attitudes  in  the  Community.  The 
enlarged  Community  will  certainly  have  to  defend  itself against 
all  forms  of  abnormal  competition,  but  from  the  outset  Spain 
should  gauge  properly  the  nature  and  the  extent  of its external 
commitments.  This  should  be  done  to  prevent  any  de  facto 
fragmentation  of  the  Common  Market,  whereby  such  comrni tments 
would  be  honoured only by  some  Member  States. 
The  Community  for  its  part,  though  recognizing  that 
Spain's  historical  ties  with  Latin  America  might  offer it fresh 
political  and  commercial  links with  _that  area,  should  NOT  agree 
to  extending  any  preferential  or  non-reciprocal  arrangements 
similar to  those  extended  to  the  ACP  countries. 
The  social  aspects  of Spanish  membership  in  the  EEC  are 
similar to  those  relating to  the  other applicants for membership. 
However,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  Spain,  as  the  eleventh 
largest  economic  power  in  the  world,  is  closer  to  the  Community 
position  than  are  Greece  and  Portugal.  Moreover,  the  social 
situation cannot  be  considered  in  isolation.  Particularly in  the 
case  of  Spain,  the  risks  of  tension  in  the  Community  labour 
market  and  the probable  cost of the  social  and  regional  aid which 
the  Community will  have  to  give  Spain must  be  weighed against  the 
advantages  the  Community  may  gain  from  the  removal  of barriers to 
a  market  as  lar~  as Spain's. 
As  the  comments  on  page  20  to  24  show,  one  result  of 
Spanish  membership  will  be  a  higher  average  rate of unemployment 
in  the  Community.  It  can  also  be  stated  with  some  certainty 
that,  in  the  present  economic  and  employment  situation,  an 
immediate  opening  of  the  Community  frontiers  to  Spanish  workers 
would  probably cause problems. - 72  -
Under  these  circumstances,  while  the  free  movement  of 
Spanish  workers  and  their  families  and  those  of  the  other 
applicants  must  be  regarded  as  an  essential  objective,  it  can 
only  be  completely  achieved  in  stages  (this  wculd  also  make  it 
easier  to  solve  the  problems  of  the  free  movement  of  workers 
between Portugal  and  Spain). 
Initially,  the  free  movement  of workers  could  be  made 
conditional  upon  the  possibilities  of  employment  in  the  Com-
munity;  it could  be  made  effective  to  start with only  in certain 
industries  or  trades  where  there  is  a  demand  for  labour.  During 
the  first  stage,  provision  should  also  be  made  for  a  safeguard 
clause  making it possible  to  put  a  temporary  stop  to  immigration. 
Free  movement  could  thus  be  organized gradually  in  such 
a  way  as  to  avoid  making  the  already  difficult  employment 
situation  even  worse,  while  still  meeting  the  needs  of  both  the 
countries  of  origin  and  the  host  countries.  In  this  way,  the 
conditions  for  the  progressive  establishment  of  a  Community 
labour market  could  be  realistically created. 
In  view  of  the  lack  of  information  on  Spain 
1 s  real 
situation  vis-a-vis  the  Communi ty
1 s  social  achievements  (and  in 
relation to  the  work  underway  to  enlarge  those  achievements)  (*), 
the  Commission  should  assemble  as  much  information on  the subject 
as  possible.  The  trade  unions  and  employers 
1  organizations  in 
the  Community  and  Spain  could  be  invited  to assist  in  this work. 
It would  also  be  interesting  to  have  some  statistics from  the 
Commission  on  the  development  of  wage· costs  in  Spain  (and  the 
other applicants)  and  what  percentage of these  costs  is accounted 
for by  social  security. 
( *)  in  particular,  equal  pay  and  equal  treatment  for  men  and 
women,  mass  redundancies,  the  maintenance  of workers'  rights 
in  the  event  of  mergers,  working  hours  and  paid  leave,  shift 
and  night work,  etc. - 73  -
The  Community's  regional  policy will  have  to  be  adapted 
when  Spain  becomes  a  member.  Indeed,  the  Community's  con-
tribution to  the  development  of the  applicant  countries will  have 
important  financial  consequences.  At  any  event,  more  care  than 
ever  before  will  have  to  be  taken  to  see  that  any  measures  put 
into effect  are  effective,  in view  of the  greater needs  that will 
make  themselves  felt.  To  this  end  Community  aid  should  depend 
on  beneficiary  countries  fulfilling  certain  obligations,  in 
particular  that  of  pursuing  reasonable  policies  which  are  com-
patible with objectives  laid  down  together. 
But  it must  be  borne  in  mind  that it is equally essen-
tial  for  the  regional  policy  to  be  implemented  within  the  Nine 
both  in  problem  areas  suffering  from  the  recession  and  the  dif-
ficulties  of  industrial  restructuring  and  in  Mediterranean  re-
gions directly concerned by  enlargement. 
From  now  on  the  problems  which  Spain  faces  in  moving 
closer to  the  EEC  must  no  longer be  considered as purely national 
problems but  as  Community  problems. - 74  -
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Investment Statistics 
THE  1979  INI  INVESTMENT  PLAN 
Allocation 6f funds 
Real  investment 
Circulating assets 
Total 
Origin of  the finance 
INI  contributions  to 
group  undertakings 
Contributions  from 
private shareholders in 
unde rt  aki  ngs 
Own  resources of the 
undertakings 
Increase  in debts 
Contributions from  the 
State  ( 1) 
Total 
187,065 
23,203 
210,268 
54,575 
5,368 
31,649 
97,922 
20,736 
210,268 
(Source  "Cinco Dias"  20  January 1979,  p.16) 
APPENDIX  I 
"  increase 
35 
20 
33 
36 
40 
59 
33 
( 1)  Chiefly accounted for by State aid  to  the  following undertakings: 
HUNOSA  (coal),  BAZAll  (shipyards  - mainly building warships},  CASA 
(aircraft},  HISPANOIL  (oil prospecting}  and ENIEPSA. - 76  -
SPANISH  INVESTMENT  ABROAD 
IN  1976,  1977  AND  1978  (1) 
(in millions of pesetas) 
Country  Position  1971! 
of in- in 
veatment  1978  amount 
~rgentina  1  2,690.4 
Venezuela  2  1,066.4 
Uruguay  3  989.2 
h1le  4  826.8 
France  5  785.9 
Porto-Rico  6  739.2 
Mexico  7  638.9 
Brasil  8  586.0 
!Algeria  9  494.5 
~oroeco  10  456.0 
~etherlands  11  407.3 
Portugal  12  358.3 
pominican 
'Republic  13  351.8 
ltJnited  14  258.5  States 
~cuador  15  248.0 
~thers  - 2,000.1 
TOTAL  - 12' 897.3 
Infonnacion Comercial  EspMOla 
Spanish Ministry for  Trade 
( 1)  Authorized direct investment 
1977 
" 
amount 
20.87  500.9 
8.77  4 p 636  o 5 
'1,67  -
6.42  224.6 
6.10  498.9 
5.  74  697.2 
4.96  160.3 
4.54  I  554.3 
3.84  -
3.54  273.7 
3.16  -
2.78  256.0 
2. 72  141.8 
2.00  1,208,4 
L93  109.4 
- 4,232.9 
100  13,494.9 
1976 
" 
S'llOunt  " 
3.72  6.9  0.16 
34.36  206.1  4.84 
- - -
1.66  8  0.19 
3. 70  555.2  13.06 
5.17  219.4  5.16 
1.18  342.7  -
4.11  786.7  18.49 
- - -
2.03  116.4  2,74 
- - -
1.89  5.8  0.13 
1.05  - -
8.96  77.1  1.82 
0,81  167.1  3.93 
- 1,741.3  -
100  4,232.  7  100 United States 
SWitzerland 
West  Germany 
France 
Spain  (resident ptas)  (2) 
Canada 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Liechtenstein 
United Kingdom 
Panama 
Liberia 
Belgium 
Saudi Arabia 
Italy 
Japan 
Others 
Total 
- 77  -
FOREIGN  INVESTMENT  IN  SPAIN  (1) 
Millions of 
pesetas 
14,054.9 
8,752.1 
8,630.4 
4,294.3 
3,132.5 
2 ,441. 7 
1,724.8 
1,575.9 
1,558,9 
870.3 
839.3 
646.4 
600.0 
308.3 
270.8 
744.2 
56,887.3 
" 
24.71 
15.33 
15.18 
10.72 
7.55 
5.51 
4.30 
3.04 
2.78 
2.75 
1.53 
1.48 
1.14 
1.06 
0.55 
0.37 
1.39 
100 
~  :  Informacion  Comercial  Espanola 
(1)  Concerns  only  those investments authorized by  the  Spanish 
author1 ties. 
Millions of 
pesetas 
6,480.~ 
5,831.1 
3,814.1 
1,474.9 
2,796.2 
8.5 
518.8 
61.7 
3,587.6 
95.4 
11.1 
893.3 
603.7 
391.9 
400.5 
28,042.4 
(2)  Concerns  investme!'lts  made  in "resident" pesetas,  i.e. pesetas 
held by foreign residents in Spain or by Spanish residents 
abroad. 
" 
23.11 
20.70 
13,61 
5.21 
9.98 
0.04 
1.86 
2.80 
0.23 
12.80 
0.35 
0.04 
3.19 
2.16 
1.40 
1.42 
100 P
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APPENDIX  III 
TRADE  IN  TEXTILES  BETWEEN  THE  EEC  AND  SPAIN 
1970  - 1977 
Textiles  and  garments  make  up  about  8%  of  Spain's 
exports  in manufactures. 
Approximately  47%  of  these  exports  of  textiles  and 
garments  go  to  the  EEC. 
EEC  imports 
These  increased  by  a  factor  of  6  between  1970  and  1977, 
with  knit ted  and  crocheted  goods  ( 10  fold  increase)  and  clothes 
(11  fold  increase)  doing particularly well. 
The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  France  are far and 
away  the  biggest  market  for  the  export  of Spanish  textiles to  the 
EEC.  But  between  1970  and  1977  the  share  of imports  taken  by  the 
FRG  fell  slightly,  whilst  the  share  taken  by  France  and  the 
Benelux countries  showed  a  substantial  increase.  During  the  same 
period  the  share  of  the  United  Kingdom  fell  sharply. 
EEC  exports 
Exports  increased  by  a  factor  of  3.3  between  1970  and 
1977  with  garments  (4  fold  increase)  registering  a  somewhat  more 
rapid growth  rate. 
France  is  Spain's  main  supplier  from  the  EEC,  coming 
ahead  of  Germany  and  Italy.  France's  position  has  improved 
slightly  by  comparison  with  that  of  the  other  EEC  countries, 
whilst  Italy  has  maintained  its position,  the  Benelux  countries 
have  improved  their  position  and  the  United  Kingdom  has  lost 
ground. - 89  -
Trade  balance 
The  export-import  ratio of  the  EEC  wen~ down  from  90% 
to  51%  between  1970  and  1977. 
In  1970 Italy and  France  had  a  trade  surplus with  Spain 
while  Great  Britain's  ".:;rade  with  Spa:'.n  was  in  overall  balance. 
In 1977  only Italy had  a  i.:rade  surplus  in all  ~hree cate-
~ories { •)  whilst  the  United  Kingdom  sti.ll  had  a  surplus  :l n 
knitted  and  crbcheted  r,ooris,  and  in  ~arrnents.  France's  trade 
wi  Lh  Sp3.:i.n  fell  i.nto  o.  defi.cil.  in  yarn  and  fabrics  in  1977  and 
her  def5.ci  t  in  l<ni tted  and  creche Led  :oods  increased.  Germany's 
trade  deficit with Spain worsened  in all categories. 
(*)  See  table  on  page  89. - 90  -
STATISTICS  (in  '000  US  dollars) 
1)  EEC  imports from  Spain 
65  841-4  Balance  841 
yarn  knitted/  garments  Total 
fabrics  crocheted 
goods 
1970  EEC  35,868  3,748  7,032  46,648 
of which  Germany  10,252  8!:.7  3,076  14,285 
France  6,394  1,7-16  1,320  9,460 
Italy  2,220  58  640  2,918 
Netherlands  2,085  201  908  3,194 
Benelux  3,835  194  472  4,501 
UK  6,512  377  475  7,364 
1977  EEC  150,835  37.591  86,732  274.798 
of which  Germany  35,615  9,:24!0  31,770  76,630 
France  44,840  13,362  16,399  74,601 
I  Italy  10,455  1,:?98  ~.~84  17,'137 
N£'therlands  8,420  4,9SO  23,588  .36,928 
Benelux  26,268  6,914  5,231  38,413 
UK  19,031  8:.11  2,653  22,515 
Share of EEC  imports  from  Spain  (") 
Germany  1970  28.6  22.9  43.7  30.4 
1977  23.6  24.6  36.6  27.9 
France  1970  17.8  45.6  18,8  20.3 
1977  29.7  35.5  18.9  27.1 
Italy  1970  6.?  1.•)  '1.1  &.:l 
19'/'/  6.<J  :•.··  {,,!)  6.'., 
NethPrlnnds  19'70  !).H  ~.4  1? .9  6.8 
19'/'/  ~ ••  &  l:J.;>  27.2  13.4 
Benelux  1970  10.7  5.2  6.7  9.6 
1977  17.4  18.4  6.0  14.0 
UK  1970  18.2  10.1  6.8  15.8 
I 
1977  12.6  2.2  3.1  8.2 - 91  -
2)  EEC  exports  to Spain 
1970  65 
ya"n 
fabrics 
1970  EEC  32,056 
of which  Germany  6,443 
France  10,'16? 
llnly  !:>,669 
Netherlands  1,097 
Benelux  1,465 
UK  4,664 
1977  EEC  104,699 
of which  Germany  23,979 
France  35,868 
Italy  18,247 
Netherlands  5,822 
Benelux  10,651 
llK  q,?  I~. 
Share  of  EF.C  t•xports  t.o  Spain  (%) 
Germany  1970  26.3 
1977  22.9 
France  1970  32.7 
19?7  34.3 
Italy  1970  17.7 
1977  17.4 
Netherlands  1970  3.4 
1977  5.6 
Benelux  1970  4.6 
1977  10.? 
UK  1970  1!:>.2 
1977  8.8 
641-4  Balanc<.  641 
1-".ni tted/  g!U'IIIents  Total 
crocheted 
goods 
4,362 
'>40 
1.1'> 
1,8~>9 
19 
4 
1,217 
12,615 
1,907 
3,547 
4,171 
97 
39 
.1, o:··t 
12.3 
14.9 
16.8 
27.7 
42.4 
32.5 
0.4 
0.8 
O.l 
0 ..  ! 
27.8 
23.6 
! 
5. 756  42,196 
797  9, '180 
··,o;•:J  13,<-'40 
1,644  9,172 
51  1,167 
35  1,504 
1,2C3  6,963 
23,472  140,966 
1,726  27.614 
9,992  49,407 
8,556  30,9'74 
256  6,177 
211  !0,901 
,',h'l:'  111,'1.'111 
13.6  23.2 
7.4  19.6 
35.1  31.4 
42.6  35.0 
26.6  21.7 
36.5  22.0 
0.3  2.8 
1.1  4.4 
0,6  :l.  6 
0,9  '/,'1 
20.9  16.5 
1 
11.5  10.6 
Source  :  Statistical Office of  the 
---ru'"ropean  Communi t 1e  s 
( 1977  figures  converted  from  EUA 
into US  dollars) . 
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3)  Export/import  Ratio of EEC  with Spain (") 
6!>  841-4  Balance 
yarn  knitted/  841  Total 
fabrics  crocheted  goods 
goods 
EEC  1970  89  117  82  90 
1977  69  34  27  51 
of which  Germany  1970  82  63  26  69 
1977  67  21  !:1  36 
France  1970  164  42  153  140 
1977  80  27  61  66 
Italy  1970  255  3,205  257  314 
1977  175  321  143  175 
Netherlands  1970  52  9  6  37 
1977  69  2  1  17 
Benelux  1970  38  2  7  33 
1977  41  0.6  4  28 
UK  1970  75  323  253  99 
1977  48  364  101  66 - 93  -
QUANTITATIVE  LIMITATIONS  IN  SPA!~ 
Under  the  EEC  Spanish  agreement  of'  1970,  Spain  opens 
quotas  to  the  EEC  each  year.  These  are  expressed  in pesetas per 
group  of'  non-liberalized products. 
These  quotas are  increased  each year by  a  tranche worth 
13%  of'  their original  value!.  Quotas  have  thus  doubled  in 8  years 
but  the  increase  has  obviously been  affected  by  inflation. 
Since  1970  Spain  has  - from  the  point  of view  of inter-
national  trade  - only  made  minor  changes  to  its list  of'  libera-
lized goods. 
Liberalized  products  are  imported  on  production  of  an 
import  declaration. 
A  certain  number  of  liberalized  products  have  been 
brought  under  supervision  since  14  June  1977.  These  measures 
were  reinforced  in  Apri  1  1978,  causing,  clear  embarrassment  to 
Communjty  exporters.  In  many  cases,  this  supervision  by  the 
Spanish authorities can  be  regarded  as  a  form  of protection. 
The  following  table  shows  the  system  applied  to  the 
main  textile products  on entering Spain. 50.09 
51.01 
51.04 
53,07 
53.10 
53.11 
55.05 
55.07,  08 
and 09 
56.05 A, 
56.06  A, 
56.07  A, 
56.05  B, 
56,06  B, 
56.07  B, 
57.06 and 
57.10 
ex  58.04 
"  .. 
- 'Jtl  -
IMPORTS  TO  SPAIN 
Main textile products 
Sj lk fabric:  A 
Yarn  of'  man-made  f'ibres 
(continuous) 
Fabrics of'  man-made  f'ibres 
(discontinuous) 
Yarn of combed  sheep's or 
lambs'  wool 
Yarn  of sheep's or lambs ' 
wool  (put  up  f'or retail 
sale) 
Fabrics of'  sheep's or 
lambs'  wool 
Cotton yarn 
Cotton f'abrics 
Man-made  f'ibres 
(Yarn and f'abrics  of' 
(man-made  f'ibres  -
(discontinuous) 
(Yarn  and  fabrics 
(of' regenerated 
(textile fibres 
(discontinuous) 
(Yarn and fabrics  of' 
(jute 
Pile fabrics  of' cotton 
Pile fabrics  of' man--.de 
f'ibres 
Pile f'abrics  of' other 
textile materials 
Quota 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Supervision  Free with  ID 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X ...  95  -
Quota  Supervision  FreP With  ID 
58.08  anc1 
58.09  Lace  X 
58.10  Embroidery  X 
59.04  Twine  and  ropes  X 
59.08  Coated fabrics  X 
59.10  Linoleum  X 
ex  60.01  Knitted or crocheted 
fabrics,  cotton  X 
..  ..  Knitted or crocheted 
fabrics,  others  X 
ex  60.04  (under garments,  knitted 
(or crocheted,  cotton  X 
ex  60.05  (under garments,  knitted 
(or crocheted,  ..  "  (other fibres  X 
62.01  and  (Travelling rugs and 
62.02  (blankets,  house  linen,  ! 
(cotton  X  ..  ..  (Travelling rugs,  house 
(linen,  others  X - 9El  -
LEVEL  OF  CUSTOMS  DUTIES  FOR  CERTAIN  TEXTILE  PRODUCTS 
(ad valorem "' 
On  entry into the  EIW  On  entry into Spain 
51.01  A  yarn of man-made  fibres  3,6  12.2 
(continuous) 
51.04  A  fabrics of man-made  fibres  5. 2  29.3 
(continuous) 
53.07  yarn of combed sheep's or  2  or 4  16.0 
lamb's  wool 
53.11  fabrics of sheep's or  7,8 or 10.8  I  19  to  25.8 
lamb's  wool 
55.05  cotton yarn not  put  Ufl  for  7  or 8  ~0.5 to  24.5(**) 
retail sale 
55.09  cotton fabrics  5,2 or 5.6 or  6  23.2  to  25.8 
within  a  quota 
ceiling 
56.01  A  man-made  fibres  3.6  11.4 
56.05  A  yarn fabrics not  made  up  .11 (*)  16 
for retail sale 
56.07  A  man-made  fibres not  made  6.4  24.3 
w.p  for retail sale 
58.04  pile fabrics  15(*)  23.2  to  28.9 
60.01  knitte~ or crocheted  5,2 or 5,6  22,4  to  27 
fabrics 
60.04  under  garment,  knj Ltcd or  10.2  ?.2  to  27 
crochl"Lcd 
60.05  garmenlr:  :  knitted or  .,. 2  <'4.:~  to  29.3 
C'roclwLC'd 
58.09  lace  4,6  to  5.6  24,7  to  28.1 
58.10  e;nbroidcry  3,6 to 5.2  24.3 
59.04  twine  and  ropes  5.2  16  to  20.1 
62.01  blankets  8.4  16  to 17.5 
62.02  house  linen  11.4  28.5 
( *)  CCT  at full  rate 
(**)  Spanish tariff at full  rate - 9'7  -
APPENDIX  IV 
THE  STEEL  INDUSTRY 
The  expansion of production 
In  the  last  decade,  Spanish  steel production has  almost 
tripled,  from  3.8  million  tons  in  1966  to  11.1  million  tons  in 
1975.  Production  in  Spain  expanded  faster  than  in  the  rest  of 
the world,  particularly the  European  Community. 
(in million of tons) 
1967  1970  1974  1977  1978 
World  496.9  595.3  708.7  673.1  712.0 
The  Nine  114.6  137.6  155.6  126.1  132.5 
Spain  4.5  7.3  11.5  11.1  11.3 
The  drop  in production between  1974  (a  record year)  and 
1977  was  much  less  marked  in  Spain  than  in  the  Community.  The 
actual  level  of production  in  Spain  in  1977  fell  far short  of the 
estimates  of  the  Plan,  which  had  set  a  production  target of 14.3 
million  tons. 
Spanish  sources  put  the  annual  capacity  of  the  steel 
industry  in  Spain  at  approximately  15  millio~  tons  of  crude 
steel,  including  8.8  million  tons  for  integrated  plants  and  6.5 
million  tons  for  non-integrating  plants.  The  latter could  pro-
duce  4.3  million  tons  of  ordinary  steel  and  2.2  mi!lion  tons  of 
special  steel.  The  fifth  four-year  Plan  anticipates  a  capacity 
of  20  million  tons  for  1982.  In  1976,  the  breakdown  of  total 
crude  steel production was  as  follows  : Employment 
- 98  -
53.8 %  LD  steel 
8.5 %  open-hearth steel 
37.7 %  electric steel 
In  1978,  77,000  people  were  employed  in  Spain's  steel 
industry,  including 5,000  in  the  processing sector. 
According  to  Spanish  sources,  labour costs  increased  by 
22%  in  1977.  The  average  wage  is  higher  then  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  Italy. 
Location of production  ce~tres 
Spanish  production  is  centred  in  the  North  and  in 
Valencia. 
The  development  plan  put  into  effect  ~Y the  government 
in  1969  set  the  industry  the  target  of  coverin~  90%  of  domestic 
needs  by  1982.  (The  Spanish  authori Lles  do  not  wish  to  turn 
steel  into  an  exporting  industry). 
At  present,  Spain  has  a  surplus  capacity  in  merchant 
bars,  beams  and  heavy plates.  But  Spanish  production falls  short 
in cold rolling and  hot coiling. 
With  regard  to non-integrated plants,  the  1973  develop-
m~nt plan  provides  for  aid  for  restructuring  the  sector by  means 
of concentrations  and  cooperation  in  projects of  common  interest. - 99  -
The  47  non-integrated  companies  - the  "resciani"  of 
Spain  - are  spread  out  over  the  whole  country.  These  companies 
are generally family-owned  businesses with electric-arc  foundries 
and  it is  hard  to  keep  a  check  on  their production,  distributive 
network  and  prices. 
The  large  amount  of  aid  promised  to  these producers at 
the  start  of  the  plan  has  since  been  reduced  to  a  more  modest 
scale  and  even  stopped  altogether  in  the  case of companies  which 
have  not yet started on  their  investment  projects. 
The  1982  production  target  for  the  non-integrated 
sector  has  been  set  at  7, 500,000  tons  as  aga1nst  the  present 
6,500,000  tons. 
With  regard  to  the  integrated  companies,  the  breakdown 
of steel production  in  1977  is as  follows  : 
ENSIDESA 
A.H.V. 
(Altos Hornos  del 
Vizcaya) 
A.H.I-1. 
(Altos  Hornos  del 
Mediterraneo) 
5,500,000  tons 
1,300,000  tons 
900,000  tons 
The  development  plan provides  for  these  three  companies 
to  set  up  plants  to  supply  their  own  semi-finished  products  and 
hot-rolled coils.  The  following projects have  been proposed,  but 
no  final  decision has yet been  reached  : 
ENSIDESA 
- installation  of  a  continuous  casting  oxygen  mill  (2  million 
tons capacity), - 100  -
- final  closure  of  an  open-hearth  mill  with  a  900,000  tons  capa-
city. 
A.H.V. 
- installation  of  a  continuous  casting  oxygen  mill  (2.3/2.5 
million tons  capacity), 
-closure  of  an  open-hearth  mill  with  a  capacity  of  1,300,000 
tons. 
A.H.M. 
- installation  of  a  continuous  casting  mill  with  a  900,000  tons 
capacity, 
- installation  of  a  hot  rolling  mill  with  a  2-4  million  tons 
capacity. 
The  production  of  the  integrated  plants  is  largely 
geared  to  flat  products,  with  long  products  being  made  by  the 
non-integrated sector. 
The  estimated figures  for  1985  are subject  to  revision, 
since  the  present  crisis has  led  to  a  reduction  in  the  proposed 
extensions  and  delays  in carrying out  the  work  involved. 
These  indicattons  show  that  the  steel  industry  is 
likely  to  be  expanded  in  the  Valencia  region  (Altos  Hornos  de 
Vizcaya).  The  Spanish  industrial  policy-makers  regard  the 
Sagonte  project  (proposed  initial  annual  capac! ty  6  million 
tons)  as  a  counterpart  to  the  Italian  plant  at  Tarente  and  the 
French  plant  at  Fos.  The  first  section  to  start  up  was  the 
cold-rolling section;  the plant developers  intend  to  complete - 101  -
the  construction  of  the  plant  in  stages  "upstream",  with  the 
blast  furnaces  last.  The  crisis  in  the  steel  industry  high-
lighted  the  problem  of  the  saturation of  the  existing  equipment 
and  hal  ted  the  construction  of  the  plant  at  the  rolling  mill 
stage.  There  were  a  number of plans  to complete  the construction 
with  public  assistance,  but  none  came  to  fruition,  largely 
because of the  reticence of US  Steel,  who  own  35~ of the capital. 
(Source  :  "L'Usine Nouvelle"). 
Foreign  trade 
In  1977,  Spain  exported  2.68  million  tons  of  steel 
products  (an  equivalent  of  3.52  million  tons of crude  steel),  as 
against  2.44  million  tons  in  1976  (3.23  million  tons  of  crude 
steel).  The  value  of  these  exports  was  51,495  thousand  million 
pesetas,  as  against  40,113  thousand  million  pesetas  in  1976. 
Exports  for  1978  are  put  at  3.5  million  tons,  including  900,000 
tons  to  the  EEC.  Internal  demand  dropped  by  18%. 
In  1977,  Spain  imported  1.2  million  tons  of  steel 
products  (an  equivalent  of  1.  45  mi 11 ion  tons  of  crude  steel); 
this represents  a  50%  drop  from  the  2.73 million  tons  imported  in 
1976  {3.29  million  tons  of  crude  steel).  The  value  of  these 
imports  was  38.594  thousand million pesetas. 
In  1977,  Spain  imported  1.01  million  tons  {equivalent 
in  crude  steel)  from  the  EEC  and  exported  1.  21  million  tons 
( equ:Lvalent  in crude  steel)  to the  EEC. 
In  tons,  the  balance  of  trade  with  the  EEC  is  thus 
slightly  in  Spain's  favour,  but  in  value  the  EEC  shows  a  surplus 
of 7.2  thousand million pesetas. 
{Source  :  Metal  Bulletin,  21.2.1978,  and  others) - 102  -
The  customs  duties  on  steel  tmports  entering Spain  are 
from  8  to  25%  dependinp  on  the product,  as against  4  to  8%  under 
the  common  external  tarlff' of the  European  Community.  In  addition 
to  this  customs  protection  Spain  provides  protection  for  the 
industry  in  the  form  of  levies  on  imports  into  Spain  (see  under 
"Conditions of competitionn). 
Industrial policy 
The  Spanish  steel  industry  is  following  a  continuous 
expansion  policy  with  the  full  support  of  the  government,  which 
also  has  holdings  in  the  industry.  There  are  in  fact  three 
distinct sectors within  the  Spanish steel  industry  : 
1)  A  nationalized  sector  consist  in.~  of  the  Ensidesa 
group,  with  most  of  its  plants  in  Asturia  and  a 
turnover of 73.4  thousand  million pesetas  in 1976. 
2)  A  private  integrated  sector  consisting  of  the  AHV 
group  (Altos  Hornos  de  Vizcaya)  with  a  turnover  of 
35.4  thousand  million  pesetas  and  the  AHI·1  group 
(Altos  Hornos  del  Medi terraneo)  with  a  turnover  of 
7.4  thousand million pesetas. 
3)  A  private  non-integrated  sector  consisting  of  a 
large  number of small  companies  working  largely with 
scrap. 
(Source  Metal  Bulletin Monthly,  July 1977). 
The  plan  aims  to  achieve  a  roughly  equal  distribution 
of capacity between each of these  three  sectors. - 103  -
According  to  the fifth national  steel plan,  the  Spanish 
steel  industry  should  reach  a  capacity  of'  20  million  tons  of 
crude  steel  in  1982,  based  on  an  estimated  internal  consumption 
of 18.8 million tons by  that date. 
The  major  expansion  of  the  Spanish  steel  industry  is 
today  one  of'  its  main  weaknesses,  while  it  is also  encouraging 
producers  to  pursue  an  aggressive  export  policy.  The  loans 
contracted  to  finance  this  expansion  and  the  interest  on  them 
must  be  repaid,  even  if  no  prof'i ts  are  made.  Spain  • s  steel 
companies  are  therefore  in  a  very  dif'ficul  t  situation.  In  Feb-
ruary  1978,  their  overall  deficit  reached  60  thousand  million 
pesetas.  The  repayment  of'  interest  accounted  for  11-12%  of'  the 
turnover,  payable  in part  in  foreign  currency.  The  State inter-
venes  on  a  large  scale  to  maintain  the  solvency  and  liquidity of 
the  companies.  There  are plans  to nationalize  a  large  section of 
the  Spanish  steel  industry,  which  has  lost  all  capacity  to  show 
prof'~ts,  at least in the  short  term. 
The  following  information  indicates  the  extent  of 
public  financial  aid  to  the  steel  industry 
After  hesitating  for  some  time,  the  Council  of  Mini-
sters on  25  August  1978 finally approved  a  Bill for financial  aid 
to  the  steel  industry  to  be  sent  to  the  Cortes  (Spain's 
Parliament).  The  runistry  for  Finance  had  had  serious  reserva-
tions  on  the  subject,  but  accepted  the  programme  submitted by  the 
Ministry for Industry. - 104  -
The  Cortes  will  have  to  approve  the  necessary  special 
funding,  since  the  Spanish  Budget  for  1978  had  not  foreseen  that 
the  economic  crisis would  require  special  financial  resources  for 
industrial  restructuring  programmes  such  as  for  the  integrated 
steel  industry.  In  1978-1979,  the  reorganization  of  this sector 
will  require  considerable  financial  aid, 
lowing  table  : 
Altos  Hornos  del 
lJfedi terraneo  (AHf-1} 
Altos  Hornos  de 
Vizcaya  (AHV) 
Ensidesa 
Total 
Funding  for 
the  Sector 
Capital 
Investment 
(in millions 
of pesetas} 
publlc  Qr].vate 
4,080  7,920 
- 1,000 
11,000  -
15,080  8,920 
as  snown  in  the  fol-
Appropriations 
(in millions 
of pesetas) 
QUblic  2rivate 
8,000  -
4,500  7,500 
11,000  -
23,500  7,500 
The  11,000 million pesetas'  credit for Ensidesa could 
represent  the  company's  foreseeable  losses  in  1978.  The  State's 
participation  in  the  reorganization  programme  amounts  to  38,580 
million  pesetas  and  that  of  the  private  sector  16,420  million 
pesetas.  The  Ministry for Industry had  stipulated that effective 
participation  by  the  private  sector  in  the  programme  would  be  a 
prerequisite for public financial  aid. - 105  -
Supplies of raw materials 
The  Spanish steel  industry is very dependent  on foreign 
supplies.  In  1976,  55.9%  of  the  ore  and  77.2%  of  the  coal  used 
were  imported  (Metal  Bulletin  Monthly,  July  1977).  The  coal 
deposits  are  mainly  found  in  the  north  of  Spain,  with  the 
principal  foreign  suppliers  being  the  United  States  and  Poland. 
The  ore  comes  from  Sweden,  North  America,  Africa,  Australia  and 
Spain.  Ore  deposits  estimated  at  30  million  tons  were  recently 
discovered  in Alquife  in the province  of Grenada. 
(Source  :  Iron  and Steel  International,  October 1976). 
The  Spanish  steel  industry  uses  a  lot  of  scrap,  which 
sometimes  leads  to  supply  dificul ties.  The  Plan  therefore  aims 
at  developing  the  direct  reduction method  for processing ore. 
Conditions of Competition 
The  main  reason  why  the  European  C0mmunity's  steel 
industry  feels  the  effects  of  Spanish  competition  so  strongly is 
because  Spain  is  not  bound  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris'  rules  on 
competition,  while  the  steel  industry of the  Nine  is. 
1)  The  Spanish  steel  industry  receives  considerable 
investment  aid  from  many  sources,  both  when  a  fac-
tory  is  first  set  up  and  when  it  is  extended  or 
modernized  (see  table  on  page  103). 
2)  As  well  as  applying  customs  duties  that  are  three 
times  those  of  the  European  Community,  Spain  also 
levies so-called  "countervailing duties"  on  imports, 
which  have  clearly protectionist effect. follows 
- 106  -
3)  Spanish  exporters,  on  the  other  hand,  are  given 
"compensatory"  refunds  when  they  export;  as  these 
are  higher  than  the  fiscal  charges  actually levied, 
they  in fact  act  as  export  subsidies. 
4)  Host  steel  goods  in  Spain  have  to  have  an  import 
licence.  On  numerous  occasions  imports  have  been 
held  up  because  of delays  in  issuing licences. 
The  Spanish  tax  code  applicable  to  steel  goods  is  as 
- Home-produced  goods  sold  in Spain  : 
Graduated  turnover tax with  low rates 
2%  on  industrial  sales  to  other  industries  or  to 
wholesalers; 
2.4%  on  sales to  retailers or consumers. 
Goods  imported  into Spain 
"Internal  countervailing  taxes"  ( ICGI)  adde~.  on  to  customs 
duties; 
The  ICGI's  on  steel  are  : 
12-15%  on  semi-rinished products  in ordinary steel; 
16%  on  hot-rolled  coils  and  finished  goods  in ordi-
nary steels. 
Spanish  goods  which  are  exported  are  exempted  from 
taxes.  The  present  exemption  rates  for  steela  correspond  to 
those  of  the  countervailing  duties  on  imports,  EO  exports have  a 
tax  advantage  of more  than  10%. - 107  -
The  Commission  has  just  introduced  a  temporary  anti-
dumping  duty  on certain sectors not  further worked  than hotrolled 
or extruded  in U,  I  or H  (Common  Customs  Tariff Heading  ex.  73.11 
AI)  originating  in  Spain.  Following  a  complainf;  from  Belgium, 
the  Commission  has  noted  that  the  import  prices  of  the  above 
products  is  again  below  the  basic  prices,  and  so  a  preliminary 
investigation indicates that  dumping  is being practised. 
The  Commission  has  also  taken  a  positive  stand  as 
regards  the  damage  suffered  by  Community  productio."l.  The  under-
cutting  practised  by  Spain  prevents  European  producers  from 
obtaining  guide  prices  and  compromises  the  balance  of  the  whole 
pricing  system,  both  for  European  producers  and  for producers  in 
other  supplying  countries  who  have  renewed  the  arrangements 
covering  trade  in  steel  products.  Apart  from  Brazil,  Spain  is 
the  only  country  that  has  not  yet  renewed  the  arrangement  for 
1979. 
The  Commission  also  notes  that  Community  imports  of U, 
I  and  H  sections  rose  from  347,000  tonnes  in  1974  to  517,000 
tonnes  in 1977  and  that  imports  from  Spain  during  the  same  period 
rose  from  32,000  tonnes  to  259,000  tonnes.  Impor-:s  have  there-
fore  acquired  a  market  share  of  10.3%  and  imports  from  Spain  a 
market  share of 5.1%. 
Position of the  European  Community's  Steel  Industry with regard 
to Spanish Accession 
Spain  provides  fierce  competition  on  the  Communi ty• s 
home  market.  To  impose  some  discipline  on  this  competition, 
which  at present is often disorderly,  the  Community's  steel - 108  ·-
industry would  really  like Spain  to  become  a  member  of  the  Commu-
nity as  rapidly as possible  and  the  Community's  rules on  competi-
tion  to  be  applicable  to  the  Spanish  steel  industry  immediately. 
This  would  open  up  Spain's  home  market  to  Community  steel  pro-
ducers. 
The  official position of  the  Community's  steel  industry 
is  set  out  in  the  momo  below  drawn  up  by  EUROFER,  the  trade 
organization  for  steel  producers  in  the  nine  Member  States.  The 
memo  dates  from  November  1977. 
* 
*  * 
:flfemo  on  Spanish membership of the  EC 
1.  EC  steel  producers  are  in  favour  of Spanish  membership 
of  the  European  Communities,  in particular the  ECSC. 
They  see  Spanish  membership  of  the  EC  as  providing  a 
way  of integrating Spanish steel production  and  the  Spanish steel 
market  more  closely with  the  EC  by  : 
a)  removing  all  the  customs  barriers,  barriers  having 
similar  effect  to  customs  barriers  a•.1d  ~ax  barriers 
which currently limit  trade between  the  EC  and  Spain; 
b)  introducing  a  common  external tariff which would  ensure 
the  homogeneousness  of  the  Community  and  would  make  it 
possible  for  the  EC  and  Spain  to  carry  out  a  joint 
policy on  trade with other countries; 2. 
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c)  bringing  about  the  involvement  of  the  Spanish  steel 
industry not  only  in ECSC  pricing rules but  also  in the 
whole  of the  EC  policy on  steel. 
Given  these  conditions,  EC  steel  producers  do  not  ask 
for a  transitional period.  They  want  Spain to  become  an  integral 
part  of  the  EC  as  soon  as  possible  and  without  any  form  of 
derogations.  They  hold  the  view  that  the  Spani~h steel  industry 
has  reaced  a  sufficient  level  of  development  to  enable  it to  be 
integrated  into  the  EC  market  without  delay. 
3.  In  the  event  of  a  transitj_onaJ.  period being applied,  at 
the  request  of  the  Spanish  Government,  or  in  the  event  of 
derogations  being  introduced  with  regard  to  the  following  condi-
tions  : 
- tariff reductions, 
- the  removal  of  barriers  having  similar  effect  to 
tariff barriers and  the  removal  of fiscal barriers, 
- pricing rules and  rules with  regard  to  alignment, 
- relations with other countries, 
- Spanish  involvement  in  EC  steel policy, 
there  would,  of course,  have  to be  a  strict reciprocity of treat-
ment  between  the  EC  and  Spain. 
4.  There  can  be  no  free  movement  of  ferrous  scrap  until 
Spain  becomes  a  full  member  of  the  EC,  i.e,  upon  expiry of  any 
temporary  derogations.  Only  once  this stage  has  been  reached  can 
there  be  said  to  be  free  movement  of  steel  between  the  current 
Community  and  Spain  and  there  would  seem  to  be  no  justification 
for giving  more  favourable  treatment  to  trade  in scrap  than  trade 
in steel products. - 110  -
The  most  favourable  treatment  which  could  be  extended 
to  Spain  during  any  transitional  period  would  be  to  grant  it 
preferential  treatment  as regards  increases  in all or part of the 
export  quotas  fixed at regular intervals by  the Council. 
* 
*  * 
Trade  organization 
The  Spanish  iron  and  steel  industries  have  an  umbrella 
organization known  as  the  HUnion  de  Empresas  y  Entidades Siderur-
gicas"  (UNESID)  which  brings  together  fifty  steel  manufacturers 
and  is  also  the  trade  organization  for  foundries,  manufacturers 
of  tubes,  wire  manufacturers  and  re-rolling mills. 
An  agreement  has  been  concluded  be'tween  the  European 
Commission  and  Spain  on  imports  of  Spanish  s~eel into  the  Commu-
nity.  Under  ~his agreement  Spanish  suppliers  have  undertaken  to 
apply  delivery  prices  not  more  than  6%  lower  than  the  price 
scales  of  Community  manufacturers  in  the  case  of  ordinary  steel 
and  not  more  than  4%  lower in the  case  of  fine  and  special  steel. 
The  agreement  also  provides  for  a  ceiling of 800,000  tonnes  in 
respect  of  Spanish  exports  to  the  Community  in 1979.  The  ceiling 
for  1978  was  900,000  tonnes  but  this  was  in  fact  exceded  by 
approximately  300,000  tonnes.  In  a  Decision dated  9  l·1ay  1979  the 
Commission  prohibited  the  linking  of  the  price  of  imported 
Spanish  iron and  steel products  to  the  supply. - 111  -
APPENDIX  V 
Spain's  economic  relations with  Latin America 
1.  Trade  (Source  :  Informacion Comercial  Espanola) 
a)  By  area 
Exports  :  the  EEC  was  Spain's  major  export  market  in 
1977,  accounting  for  46.3%  of  Spanish  exports  ~46.4%  in  1976), 
followed  by  the  United  States  with  9.  8%  ( 10.2%),  Latin America 
with  9.8%  (9.6%)  and  the  Near  East  (including Algeria)  with  7.5% 
(6.6%). 
Imports  :  the  EEC  was  Spain's  major  supplier  in  1977, 
accounting for  34.1% of Spanish  imports  (33.1%  in 1976),  followed 
by  the  Near  East  (including  Algeria)  with  22.7%  (24.7%),  the 
United  States with  12%  (14.2%)  and  Latin America with  9%  {7%). 
b)  By  country 
Exports  the  only Latin American  country  among  Spain's 
12  most  important  export  markets  in  1977  was  Venezuela  (lOth 
position). 
Imports  :  the  only Latin American  country  among  Spain's 
12  most  important  suppliers  in 1977  was ~  (8th position). 
General  Remarks 
Trade  with  Latin  America  still  accounts  for  only  a 
small  proportion  of  Spain's  overseas  trade.  However,  in  area 
tenns,  there  was  a  marked  increase  in  trade  with  Latin  America 
from  1976  to 1977,  particularly in  imports. - 112  -
By  country,  imports  from  Brazil  increased  by  36.4%  from 
1976  to  1977  and  imports  from  Venezuela  by  68.8%. 
Spain's  5  most  important  suppliers  (in  1977)  in  Latin 
America  were  Brazil,  Argentina,  Cuba,  Venezuela  and  Colombia. 
Spain's  5  most  important markets  were  Venezuela,  Cuba,  Argentina, 
Brazil  and  r.texico. 
2.  Foreign  investme~ 
Latin  America  is  the  most  favoured  area  for  Spanish 
foreign  investment. 
World 
( 1) 
Development  of Spain's direct foreign  investment 
(in millions  of pesetas) 
Total  Total  I 1974  1975  1976  I  1963-1973  1974-1977 
total 
15,864  28,411  8,673  1,990  4,253 
Latln America 
(2)  4,595  13,945  2,807  369  1,905 
{2) 
Ral:io -- 29  %  49%  32.4%  18.6%  44.8% 
( 1) 
Sources  Spanish r.Unistry of Trade  and  Tourism  figures. 
1977 
13,495 
8,864 
65.7% - 113  -
In  1977,  Spaj n  invested  directly  in  Latin  America  in 
industry  {59%  of the  ~otal),  the  financial  sector- banks  (30.2%) 
and  the  primary  sector  - agriculture,  stock-fo.nning  and  fishing 
(9.3%),  with  the  remaining  1.5%  being  distributed  over  all 
sectors. 
3.  Lines of credit 
The  growing  volume  of  credit  granted  to  Latin  America 
is an  ipdication of Spain's interest  in that area. 
Of  the  22  lines  of  credit  opened  by  the  Banco  Exterior 
de  Espana  (as  of  30.6.1978),  12  were  granted  to  Latin America,  5 
to Africa  and  5  to  Europe. 
The  credit  granted  in  dollars  to  Latin America  (10  out 
of  15  lines)  represented  620  million  (out  of  a  'ectal  of  1,021) 
and  the  credit  in  pesetas  ( 2  1 ines  out  of  7)  represented  7, 786 
million  (out  of a  totalof 34,886). 
These  lines  of  credit  in  Latin  America  had  positive 
results,  since  the  percentage  of  credit  used  was  60%  (as  at 
30.6.1978). - 114  -
Agricultural statistics 
Total  area and  total agricultural  area  ('000 ha) 
Spain .................  . 
Greece  ..•••••.••.•..•.. 
Portugal  .•.•.••..•.•••• 
(9  EEC  States .....•..•• 
(12  EEC  States ••...•..• 
Percentaee of Agriculture  in  the  GDP 
Spain .....•...•..•••... 
Greece  .•............••. 
Portugal  •....••........ 
(9  EEC  States  .•.••....• 
(12  EEC  States ••...•••• 
50,480 
13,200 
9,160 
152,860 
225,700 
8.9% 
16.5% 
14.5% 
4.4%) 
5.0%) 
Percentage of population employed  in agriculture 
Spain  •••...•..••.•..•.. 
Greece  .•...•..••..•.••. 
Portugal  •.••••••.••.••• 
(9  EEC  States ••••.•.••• 
( 12  EEC  States  ••••.•.•• 
22.0% 
35.4% 
28.1% 
8.7%) 
11.3%) 
APPENDIX  VI 
32,078) 
9,155)  45,403 
4,170) 
93,484) 
138,887) 
Agricultural  exports  as percentage  of total exports 
Spain  •••..•••.••••••..• 
Greece  •.•••••..•••••... 
Portugal  •.....•••..••.. 
(9  EEC  States ..••.•..•• 
(12  EEC  States  •.••••••• 
25.4% 
31.7% 
17.1% 
12.1%) 
12.5%) - 115  -
Production of fruit,  vegetables,  wine  and  olive oil as percen-
tage of total agricultural production 
Spain  ••••••••••••••••• 
Greece  ••...••••...••..• 
Portugal  ••.••••••••.•.• 
(9  EEC  States  .•.••••••• 
34.8% 
28.4% 
38.1% 
16.9%) 
Exports  of fr·uit,  vegetables,  wine  and  olive oil as  ocrcenta_ge 
of total agricultural exports 
Spain  •••...•.•.•.••••.. 
Greece  •••••.•..•••••.•• 
Portugal  •.•.•.•..•..••. 
74.0% 
67.0%  (+  21%  for  tobacco) 
59.0% 
Percentage  of farms  less than  10 hectares  in size 
Spain .................. 
Greece  ................. 
Portugal  ............... 
Italy •.•.•••.•.•.•••••• 
France  •.••••.••••..•••• 
Germany  •••••....•••••.• 
UK  ••••••••••••••••••••• 
70.5% 
93.6% 
87.5% 
86.2% 
40.5% 
59.0% 
31.1% 
(50% 
(73% 
(72% 
5  ha) 
5  ha) 
5  ha) - 116  -
Total  population  ('000)  and  estimated per capite  GOP 
Spain  .•••••..•••••••••. 
Greece  ••••••••••••.••.• 
Portugal  ••••..••••••... 
35,472 
9,047 
8,762 
258,462) 
311, 743) 
2,384  us  dollars 
2,309 
(9  EEC  States  •••.•..••• 
(12  EEC  States  •••••.•.• 
Germany 
1,504 
3,753 
France  • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • • . • . . • • • •  3, 945 
Italy  . . • • • . • • • ..  . • • • • . • • • • • • • . • . • • • •  2, 742 
EEC  share  of agricultural  trade 
Imports 
Spain  ••••••.•••••  11.2% 
Greece  .•••..••••.  28.7% 
Portugal  12.1% 
Some  yields  (g/ha) 
Wheat  Barley 
Spain .........  15.5  18.1 
Greece  ........  15.4  23.4 
Portugal  ......  8.2  8.4 
(9  EEC  States).  37.2  36.5 
Maize 
37.3 
35.6 
11.9 
48 
Exports 
55.8% 
54.3% 
45.4% 
Potatoes 
141.1 
151.4 
86 
240.1 
Beet 
321 
592.2(?) 
399.2 
t!.&  There  are  also  low  yields  (20-25  hl/ha)  in  Spanish  wine-
growing,  where  there is considerable potential  for  improvement. - 117  -
Consumption of selected products  in  kg.  per capita 
1  9  7  5  9  EEC  SPAIN  GREECE  PORTUGAL 
States  66/77 
All  meats  ............  81.9  60.1  59.1  51.1 
Liquid  and  processed 
milk .................  102.1  102.4  94.4  63.8 
Butter ...............  6.8  0.4  0.9  0.7 
Cheese  ...............  10.9  3.4  14.8  3.2 
Wheat  ................  63  78  115  76 
Potatoes .............  82  112  52  112 
Sugar ................  38  27  17  30 
Fresh vegetables .....  98  127  137  148 
(66/67) 
Fresh fruit ..........  56  96  120  78 A
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